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Article
Power Forward:
The Argument for a National RPS
LINCOLN L. DAVIES
The debate over a national renewable energy requirement has lost its
way. Perhaps one of the most important legislative proposals in recent
memory because it could transform the United States’ energy
infrastructure, this “renewable portfolio standard” or “RPS” would likely
compel electric utilities to obtain one-fifth of their power from renewable
resources. Yet the discourse over this proposal has veered from the core
question it raises. With thirty-six state RPSs already in place, the key issue
is not whether there should be an RPS at all but whether a state or federal
regime will best accomplish the RPS’s objectives. This Article concludes
that the evidence overwhelmingly points to the need for a national law.
The Article reaches its conclusion using three tools: a multi-state survey of
state RPSs; a newly developed metric of state RPS design, their “efficacy
tendency”; and extant data on RPS performance. Finally, the Article
suggests that another overlooked rationale argues for a federal law: a
national RPS can help energy law and environmental law merge.
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Power Forward:
The Argument for a National RPS
LINCOLN L. DAVIES*
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade, debate over a national renewable energy
requirement has been mired in congressional deadlock. More than twentyfive proposals for this so-called federal “renewable portfolio standard”
(“RPS”) have been introduced on Capitol Hill, but not one has passed both
chambers. Words have been harsh. Opponents of the measure have called
it everything from “a new energy tax”1 to “a huge wealth transfer,”2 from
“an unneeded subsidy”3 to “a major policy blunder.”4 Proponents, by
contrast, have been effusive on multiple fronts. In the RPS, they see the
United States’ energy future, a law that will “create jobs, save consumers
money,”5 reduce pollution, “reduce the cost of capital,”6 and “increase our
energy security and enhance the reliability of the electricity grid.”7 Both
sides’ positions thus staked, the result has been predictable: an “ossified”
stalemate, a “long congressional deep freeze.”8
The federal debate is the result of massive state action. Since 1983,
more than two-thirds of the country—thirty-six states9—have adopted their
* Associate Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. This Article
benefited from the insightful comments of Teneille Brown, Phoenix Cai, Brigham Daniels, Jason
Groenewold, Jim Rasband, Lisa Sun, Buzz Thompson, Chris Whytock, and Amy Wildermuth, and
from most helpful dialogue at the Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Forum, the J. Reuben Clark Law
Society’s Second Annual Faculty Section Conference, and the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College
of Law’s Faculty Scholarship Workshop. Steven Anderson, Jason Groenewold, and Adam Reiser
provided excellent research assistance. I dedicate the Article to my grandfather, Sherman D. Davies,
who is always an inspiration.
1
151 CONG. REC. S6688 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Talent).
2
Id. at S6682 (statement of Sen. Craig).
3
Id. at S6677 (statement of Sen. Alexander).
4
Robert J. Michaels, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct,
Economically Suspect, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2008, at 9, 10 [hereinafter Michaels, Politically Correct].
5
153 CONG. REC. E311 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Udall).
6
Renewable Electricity: Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th
Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Ralph Izzo, President, Chairman, and CEO, Public Service Enterprise
Group, Inc.).
7
153 CONG. REC. S7597 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
8
X, Forget a Federal RPS—Here’s an Idea that Will Work, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2009, at 6, 6.
9
This Article’s survey includes thirty-five states plus the District of Columbia. For ease of
reference, however, this Article refers to those jurisdictions that have adopted RPSs as “thirty-six
states,” acknowledging of course that the District of Columbia lacks state status. Recently, Oklahoma
also adopted an RPS, bringing the “state” total to thirty-seven. This enactment came too close to
publication to include within the Article’s survey.
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own RPSs: laws that require electric utilities to obtain a certain percentage
of the energy they sell from renewable resources. This burgeoning trend
has led some to deem state RPSs the “epitom[e] . . . of state action in the
absence of strong federal support for renewable energy.”10 Indeed, those
opposed to a national RPS charge that state efforts represent a regulatory
“race to the top” that federal action would stunt. Opponents also assert that
a national law would unfairly disadvantage those states that are
comparatively poor in renewable resources, and that the RPS should not be
perpetuated as a regulatory tool at all because it is cumbersome and
inefficient in its aims.11 On the other side, those urging a national effort
have relied on traditional arguments for federal law’s elevation, including
that state RPSs risk an unmanageable regulatory mélange, that national
uniformity is needed to fix the state hodgepodge, and, most vociferously,
that a federal RPS would offer a wealth of societal benefits.12
Remarkably, missing from this debate is a discussion of what a federal
law would mean for achieving RPS objectives. Scholars increasingly point
to energy deregulation as broken, its attempt to rely on markets a
regulatory failure. The flagship examples are Enron and the California
crisis,13 but the critique cuts more broadly. Depending on whom you ask,
electricity deregulation has “faced many challenges”14 or yielded “mixed

10
Kevin L. Doran, Can the U.S. Achieve a Sustainable Energy Economy from the Bottom-Up?:
An Assessment of State Sustainable Energy Initiatives, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 95, 107 (2006).
11
See infra Part IV; cf. BARRY G. RABE, PEW CTR. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RACE TO THE
TOP: THE EXPANDING ROLE OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 1–2 (2006), available
at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf (discussing future opportunities and
challenges faced by state RPS programs).
12
See infra Part IV.
13
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY REFORM: FOCUS ON RETAIL COMPETITION, at i
(2001) (examining a potential need for federal regulation of retail electricity competition); ERIC HIRST,
THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: LESSONS FOR OTHER STATES 1 (2001), available at
http://www.eei.org/issues/comp_reg/CALessons_hirst.pdf (arguing that competitive markets are
successful despite California’s failure at restructuring); MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER
FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON 15 (2003) (discussing the collapse of
Enron); Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s
Restructuring Disaster, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2002, at 191, 191–92 (discussing California’s attempt
at regulating electricity markets and the problems in regulating electricity markets in general); Timothy
P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG.
471, 473 (2002) (arguing that California’s failure at restructuring electricity was caused by legislative
and administrative failure in preventing opportunistic behavior); Paul L. Joskow, California’s
Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 365, 374 (2001) (discussing the California energy
crisis); Michael A. Yuffee, California’s Energy Crisis: How Best To Respond to the “Perfect Storm,”
22 ENERGY L.J. 65, 65 (2001) (arguing that California’s energy crisis was due to “illogical policies and
poorly designed market structures”); Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The
Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 5 (2004)
(analyzing the fallout from the failure of Enron and the California energy crisis).
14
Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
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16

results.” It has been everything from a “fiasco” to a “palpable failure”17
to “on balance a success.”18 Despite these mixed reviews, commentators
tend to agree that where deregulation has failed, it is because policy design
matters. “Restructuring’s major failures should be blamed not on
opportunistic behavior by any party or group of parties, but rather on the
failure . . . to develop precise policy goals and complete performance
metrics . . . .”19 When proposed legislation would rely on the same marketbased tools that restructuring has used, one would expect the discourse to
focus heavily on the legislation’s policy aims and design. Yet this part of
the RPS debate has not been staged. There has been virtual silence.
This Article aims to break the silence. It takes up a fundamental, yet
largely unaddressed, question in the RPS debate. Will the RPS’s core aim
of promoting renewable energy be more likely accomplished if the law is
federal rather than state-based? Or, have sideshows distracted the RPS
debate from the measure’s central pursuit? Are politics standing in the
way of good policy?
Using a new empirical survey of existing state RPSs and available
existing data on state RPS performance, this Article seeks to answer these
questions. It offers four contributions:
1. Evidence of both state RPS design and performance
strongly favors a national standard. This Article’s state law
survey shows that the risk of patchwork regulation is real.
Reliance on state RPSs frustrates these laws’ very purpose:
incentivizing deployment of renewable technologies. It does
this by creating different market definitions for renewable
energy and, with even greater variance, for renewable energy
credits (“RECs”) that can be used to comply with the laws.
2. The survey also reveals that state RPSs erect
geographically-based barriers to trade at an alarming rate.
More than three-quarters of states impose geographic
restrictions of one kind or another. Although commentators
previously have pointed to the constitutional dilemmas of
15
John E. Kwoka, Jr., Twenty-Five Years of Deregulation: Lessons for Electric Power, 33 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 885, 886 (2002).
16
Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J.
1141, 1158–59 n.89 (2006) (reviewing LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION
FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005)).
17
Robert Kuttner, Keynote Address at the University of North Carolina Center on Poverty, Work,
and Opportunity and the American Constitution Society for Law and Society: Wealth Inequality and
the Eroding Middle Class (Nov. 4–5, 2007), in 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 417, 421 (2008).
18
Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate Re(regulation)
After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 108 (2005).
19
Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid Integration, 28
ENERGY L.J. 147, 148 (2007).
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such limits, just as problematic is that geographic barriers
undermine RPS aims. Geographic restrictions to trade
preclude development of a uniform market for renewable
electric generation technologies, the very market that RPSs
seek to promote.
3. State RPS policy design confirms that a federal
approach is most appropriate. Early feedback suggests that
different state RPSs have varied widely in their success; this
may well be attributed to divergent policy designs. This
Article develops a new four-pronged metric for assessing
RPS policies, termed the laws’ “efficacy tendency.”20
Applying this metric reveals that state RPS designs differ
significantly not only among each other, but also within
possible policy traits as well. This only underscores the
conclusion that a federal RPS, if well designed, has much to
add to the current state of affairs.
4. Another justification for the RPS also supports a
national approach.
The RPS accomplishes what few
proposals do—it merges energy and environmental
objectives. Historically, these two fields have been at odds.
Energy law has focused on economics: a reliable energy
supply at a reasonable price. Environmental law has centered
on health and risk: protection from pollutants and moderation
of resource consumption. A federal RPS, however, offers an
opportunity for achieving both objectives. In the electric
generation sector at least, a national RPS would ensure a
diversified energy supply that is reliable, cost-efficient, and
environmentally friendly. The RPS debate thus far has
largely ignored the benefits of such a legal merger.
The Article proceeds in five substantive parts. Part II begins by tracing
the history of electricity regulation. Part III reviews the RPS, its policy
objectives, and implementation. Part IV appraises the federal-state RPS
debate, outlining the arguments for and against the RPS’s federalization.
Part V then weighs the direct evidence on the federal-state question,
employing this Article’s survey of state RPSs and the newly developed
“efficacy tendency” metric of RPS design. Part VI concludes by briefly
assessing whether the RPS’s combination of energy and environmental
objectives independently advocates for a state or national regime.

20

See infra Part V.D.
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II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE: ELECTRICITY REGULATION
The field of energy law is vast, even when placed next to
environmental law’s breathtaking regulatory scope.21 Put the two together,
and it becomes immediately apparent that the RPS barely scratches the
surface. From an energy perspective alone, this is obvious. Energy falls
into two categories. There are “primary” energy sources—the fuels at the
heart of resource extraction: crude oil, coal, natural gas, nuclear sources,
and renewables. And there are “secondary” and “tertiary” energies—the
refined and processed fuels at the core of how society runs: gasoline,
synthetic gas, and electricity.22
An RPS tackles only one of these energy forms, and it touches only
one aspect of it. The RPS’s subject is electric generation, specifically, one
portion of electric utilities’ generation mix. But even taking electric
generation alone, the RPS leaves much more untouched. It does not deal
with the transport of electricity (“transmission”), even for the renewables it
seeks to promote.23 It does not address ultimate delivery (“distribution”) or
day-to-day system operations (“reliability”), even though the use of many
renewables, particularly wind and solar, heavily impacts that question.24
And it does not change price (“ratemaking”) or cost recovery (“prudency”)
determinations, even though investor assurance is very much what RPSs
are about.
The RPS, then, is limited in its own sphere, and is further limited when
one considers everything else that energy regulation controls. Thus, while
a national RPS ultimately may raise questions about what shape energy
law should take,25 most critical to understanding the RPS is not the myriad
other aspects of energy law,26 but electricity regulation itself.
21
See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5–6 (2004); JAMES
SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1–2 (2d ed. 2007); see
also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short
History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1003–04 (1994) (examining environmental
law’s “amazing subject matter diversity”); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 22–23 (2001) (arguing that the United States is currently “stuck in
the same basic regulatory system that was established in the 1970s, when all of the major federal
regulatory statutes that we currently have were enacted”); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of
Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 238–39, 248–50 (2000)
(describing the numerous problems environmental law policy seeks to address).
22
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 402 (2008),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf [hereinafter EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY
REVIEW].
23
See Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 68 (2008).
24
See, e.g., Warren C. Kotzmann, Flipping the Switch on Alternative Energy?, 29 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19, 22–23 (2009).
25
See infra Part VI.
26
See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 24, 78, 209, 407, 801, 1179, 1243–44 (2d ed. 2006); JAMES E. HICKEY, JR. ET AL., ENERGY
LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY §§ 2-1, 4-1, 5-1, 7-1, 8-1, 9-1, 10-1, 11-1, 12-1 (2000).
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Electricity regulation today is the result of two countervailing
historical forces: initially, government intervention to mediate imperfect
competition’s effects, and then, a pendulum-like effort to free industry
from regulatory restraint. This cycle of regulation-to-deregulation is not
unique to energy law,27 but it defines the field. The clear arc of electricity
regulation over the past decades reflects a transformation from a highly
regulated industry where prices and supplies were subject to direct
governmental review, to a still-regulated industry in which the market
structure that determines prices and supplies is the subject of governmental
oversight. In this sense, energy law’s path is not one of deregulation per
se, but of restructuring.28 No matter its changes, however, energy law’s
central objective remains the same: to provide an abundant, stable energy
supply at a low price.29
A. Origins and Objectives
To place electricity regulation’s origins, nearly ancient history must be
traced. Contemporary electricity law has its foundation in the so-called
“regulatory compact,” a convention dating to common law regulation of
industries that, today, most observers scarcely would consider energyrelated.30 The purpose of this implicit bargain—what then-Judge Kenneth
Starr called a fictional government-business “compact of sorts”—is clear.31
The private company takes on the mantle of the “public utility,” receives a
legally protected monopoly to serve a specified geographic area and, in
exchange, assumes the obligation to reliably deliver that service under
“intensive regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free
market.”32 The common law thus built the regulatory compact around six
27
See Duane, supra note 13, at 489–90 (“The apparent success of deregulation in other industries
(such as airlines, telecommunications, natural gas, trucking) clearly served as a model for deregulation
advocates in the electricity sector.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 463–64 (2005) (acknowledging the same trends
among differing industries); Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government
Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 829 (1998) (describing the cycle of laissez-faire competition to
regulation to deregulation).
28
Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory
Efforts To Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 781 n.70.
29
Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV.
355, 375–76 (1990).
30
See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 24 (“Regulation of ferries, sewers, mills, bridges, and
railroads provide the historical origins for modern public utility regulation.”); Jim Rossi, Universal
Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither the Duty To Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J.
27, 29 (2000) (describing how current regulation is derived from “ancient” common law).
31
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring).
32
Id.; see also Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 104 S.W.3d 225, 227–28 (Tex.
App. 2003) (“Under a fully regulated system, an electricity utility enters into a ‘regulatory compact’
with the public: in return for a monopoly over electricity service in a given area; the utility agrees to
provide service to all requesting customers and to charge only the retail rates set by the [Public Utility]
Commission.”).

2010]

POWER FORWARD: THE ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL RPS

1347

pillars, namely, the utility’s (1) exclusive provision of (2) a public good
(3) at a reasonable price (4) in a fixed territory, (5) under an obligation to
serve all members of the public in that area, but (6) subject to revision of
the compact’s terms as technology evolved.33
Different commentators offer different rationales for this governmental
intrusion,34 but the generally accepted justification today is the neoclassical
economic assertion that regulation is necessary to correct market
imperfections.35 Electric utilities traditionally have been seen as “natural
monopolies”: The first market entrant takes a preference position because
the cost of building a new system on top of the old one would be
redundant.36 The “key idea” of the natural monopoly is that limiting a
market to a single provider can “realize economies of scale.”37 “It is
relatively inexpensive, for example, to add another electricity end user to a
system once generation, transmission, and distribution are constructed.”38
The very notion of the regulatory compact, then, hinges on a theory of
economic efficiency, to wit, an attempt to ensure less expensive service for
the public from one utility rather than having multiple companies battle to
a price through competition. Because the regulatory compact cements a
firm’s position as a monopoly, however, it raises the concern that the
utility will charge supra-competitive rates—that it will unilaterally increase
prices (and its own profits) because it faces no competition.39 For this
reason, the flipside of the regulatory compact’s guarantee of exclusivity is
the utility’s obligation of “reasonable” rates.40
From the perspective of electricity, the net result of the regulatory
compact was the nationwide emergence of “vertically integrated” utilities,
33

BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 46.
See, e.g., George Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the “Theories of Regulation”
Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 303 (1993).
35
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 51. But see Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its
Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548–49 (1969) (challenging the natural monopoly rationales for
regulation); Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 447–
48 (2002) (summarizing critiques of the natural monopoly as a regulatory justification).
36
See Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual
Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1138–39.
A natural monopoly arises when the average costs of producing a product or
service declines as more of the product or service is supplied to the market. Because
of declining average costs, it is more efficient from the perspective of lowering the
average cost of production to have one firm serve the market rather than duplicate
expenditures. Average costs are falling either because there are huge fixed costs to
production or because the costs of producing an additional unit of the product or
service is negligible.
Id.; accord SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE 22–24 (1988); DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 513–14 (1989).
37
Joseph P. Tomain, The Persistence of Natural Monopoly, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 242,
242 (2002) [hereinafter Tomain, Natural Monopoly].
38
Id.
39
See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15–16 (1982).
40
See Rossi, Universal Service, supra note 30, at 34–35; Tomain, Natural Monopoly, supra note
37, at 242; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 57–58.
34
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“one-stop-shopping” companies that generated their own power, moved
that power vast distances over bulk transmission systems they built and
owned, and then ultimately delivered the power to retail customers using
the companies’ own local distribution lines. For decades, these companies
dominated the industry under the rosy perception that the public was being
served, the compact worked, and all was well.41 This began to unravel,
however, when in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, electricity prices
precipitously climbed, and the massive capital investments that utilities had
been sinking into their systems came under heightened political scrutiny.42
Close behind was legislative willingness to tinker with the status quo,43
followed by a bevy of studies urging industry transformation.44
Through all of this, the singular objective of the regulatory compact
remained constant—reliable service at reasonable rates—but the regulatory
mechanisms used to get there did not. They changed, dramatically.
B. Mechanisms
Over time, the mechanism invoked to carry out electricity regulation’s
task became almost as entrenched as the regulatory compact itself.
Enacted in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”)45 set the framework
for the governance of virtually all utilities and common carriers. It created
an administrative agency charged with closely monitoring the industry and
ensuring that it “provided services in standardized packages at
standardized prices to all similarly situated end-users.”46 What soon
followed were industry-specific statutes spreading the ICA’s approach
across society.47 Most notably for the electric sector, Congress in 1920
41
See Jim Chen, The Death of the Regulatory Compact: Adjusting Prices and Expectations in the
Law of Regulated Industries, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265, 1337 (2006) (arguing that the vertically integrated
electric utility “may have reflected the most efficient arrangements available to the United States” in
the twentieth century); Rossi, Universal Service, supra note 30, at 32 (noting efficiencies of vertical
integration).
42
Tomain, Past and Future, supra note 35, at 450–51.
43
Id. at 451–54; accord Pierce, supra note 27, at 453–55.
44
See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1974); PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR
POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal
to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV.
345 (1983).
45
24 Stat. 379 (1887). The ICA established the now-defunct Interstate Commerce Commission
(“ICC”), which regulated, among other things, railroads. The ICC’s functions now reside with the
Surface Transportation Board. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803
(1995); see also Overview of Surface Transportation Board, http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/about/
overview.html (last visited June 17, 2010).
46
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (1998).
47
See, e.g., Nw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 181 F.2d 19, 22 (8th Cir. 1950)
(“The plan or scheme of the Federal Power Act is analogous to that of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
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created the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”), now succeeded by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”),48 and passed a key
statute it administers, the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).49
The FPA implemented the regulatory compact through a dual mandate.
First, it created a command-and-control regime with wholesale electricity
and transmission prices subject to FERC oversight. FERC thus became
obligated to use its expertise to ensure that rates strike a balance between
investors and consumers. Rates charged under the FPA must be “just and
reasonable”50—a regulatory term-of-art for prices that (1) assure a fair
return on stockholder investment and the continuing attraction of capital
but (2) do not overcharge consumers.51 Such rates also must be
nondiscriminatory; the FPA prohibits FERC-jurisdictional utilities from
giving “any undue preference or advantage” to customers.52 In addition,
rates subject to the FPA cannot be collected until they have been submitted
for FERC review—and then only those rates and no others can be
charged.53
Second, the FPA charged FERC with overseeing proposed utility
mergers, as well as sales, leases, and transfers of certain utility-owned
assets.54 The primary purpose of this authority was to ensure that utilities
do not use mergers and acquisitions as a backdoor to unfairly increase
profits by cross-subsidizing their non-utility affiliates.55 Combined with
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (“PUHCA”),56 which
sought to reverse the growing “wave of consolidation[]” of utilities into
non-energy-related holding companies across the nation,57 FERC gained
U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., and decisions under the latter Act should be controlling here.”), aff’d, 341 U.S.
246, 255 (1951).
48
For convenience, this Article uses “FERC” to refer both to the FPC and FERC itself.
49
16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–823d (2006). The 1920 enactment governed hydroelectric power. In 1935,
amendments to the FPA expanded FERC’s authority over electric transmission and wholesale power
sales. Id. §§ 824–824w. In 1938, Congress passed the FPA’s counterpart for the natural gas industry,
the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2006). For a pithily insightful history of the
FPA, see Richard D. Cudahy, 70th Anniversary Celebration of the Federal Power Act, 26 ENERGY L.J.
389 (2005). For a broader evaluation, see DAVID HOWARD DAVIS, ENERGY POLITICS (4th ed. 1993).
50
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
51
See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603–06 (1944) (holding that a
rate set by the FPC that enabled a gas company to operate successfully, maintain its financial integrity,
attract capital, and compensate its investors was valid); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679, 689–92 (1923) (holding that a rate set by the PSC was unjust and
unreasonable because it failed to accord proper weight to the enhanced costs of construction).
52
16 U.S.C. § 824d(b). If FERC believes that previously approved rates have become “unjust
and unreasonable” or discriminatory, it has the power to investigate and correct the situation. Id.
§ 824e(a).
53
Id. § 824d(c)–(e). This is the ironclad rule of utility law known as the “filed rate doctrine.”
See, e.g., Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981).
54
16 U.S.C. § 824b(a).
55
Id. § 824b(a)(4).
56
15 U.S.C. §§ 79–79z-6 (2006).
57
Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest’s Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 190–91 (1983); see
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immense control not only over electricity rates, but also over the very
structure of the industry.58
Initially, and long thereafter, FERC carried out its FPA duties using
“cost-of-service” ratemaking. The agency tied utility rates to the
investments they actually made in their systems, and then sought,
administratively, to replicate price levels that would give utilities the kind
of return on their investment they would have made if the market were
However, concerns that traditional cost-of-service
competitive.59
ratemaking was inherently flawed,60 coupled with the arrival of non-utility,
or “independent,” power producers,61 ultimately led FERC to allow utilities
to begin charging “market-based” rates.62 In this emerging regime, the
new theory was that if FERC policed markets to ensure that they were
functionally competitive, the FPA’s “just and reasonable” requirement
would be fulfilled. That is, actually competitive rates would be more
accurate, and more efficient, than cost-of-service ratemaking’s crude and
cumbersome effort at merely approximating competition.63
also Nidhi Thakar, Note, The Urge To Merge: A Look at the Repeal of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 903, 913 (2008) (“In 1926 alone, there were more
than 1000 mergers, most of which involved sales of public utilities to private companies . . . controlled
by large holding companies.”).
58
FERC jointly administered PUHCA with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 largely repealed PUHCA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 (2006); see also
Repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and Enactment of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 2005, 70 Fed. Reg. 75,592, 75,592–93 (Dec. 20, 2005) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. pts. 365 & 366); Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, PUHCA’s Gone: What Is Next for
Holding Companies?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2–3, 24 (2006) (examining the conditions that gave rise to
PUHCA and the changes that resulted in its repeal); infra Part II.C (examining FERC’s role in
regulating the industry).
59
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 78–79. The details of cost-of-service ratemaking are
extraordinarily complex. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES
109, 112–20 (2d ed. 1988); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 435–36 (3d ed. 1993).
60
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 551, 609 (1979) (examining the problems with
various modes of classical regulation). Cost-of-service ratemaking is time-consuming and expensive,
and agency economists face immense informational asymmetries.
61
See Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory Policy, 16
ENERGY L.J. 419, 425 (1995); Tomain, Natural Monopoly, supra note 37, at 451–53.
62
See Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,234, at p. 61,760 (1992); Dartmouth Power Assocs.
Ltd. P’ship, 53 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,117, at pp. 61,358–59 (1990); Doswell Ltd. P’ship, 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,251,
at pp. 61,757–58 (1990).
63
See Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, 128 S.
Ct. 2733, 2747–48 (2008) (holding that FERC can only declare a mutually agreed-upon contract for
electricity as unjust and unreasonable when the public consumer is seriously harmed); La. Energy &
Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 141 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that
FERC may rely on market-based rates in a competitive market to satisfy the “just and reasonable”
requirement); Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 10 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (holding that FERC’s approval of market-based rates does not violate its obligation to ensure just
and reasonable rates). There are, however, opponents to market-based rates. See, e.g., Jeffrey
McIntyre Gray, Reconciling Market-Based Rates with the Just and Reasonable Standard, 26 ENERGY
L.J. 423, 429–31 (2005) (explaining that FERC cannot ensure just and reasonable rates if it cannot
assure that a competitive market exists); Gerald Norlander, May the FERC Rely on Markets To Set
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Market-based rates were the opening shot in the electric power
regulatory revolution. The old school of thought that electric utilities were
natural monopolies by definition gave way to a new vision that the
monopoly could be disaggregated into “its three component parts:
generation, transmission, and distribution.”64 Under this vision, traditional
utilities could compete with other companies for power sales, while the
only true “bottleneck” facilities with actual natural monopoly attributes—
the transmission and distribution systems—could be opened for all
comers.65 And thus, the “great transformation” of the industry began.66
Rather than dictating prices directly, FERC invoked novel instruments
to regulate the markets, and then let the markets set the price. FERC
created a standardized, though complex,67 test for assessing where and
when generation owners could unduly influence electric prices—and, by
extension, where they would and would not be allowed to charge marketbased rates.68 It institutionalized a similar screen for reviewing mergers,
seeking to prevent deals that could dampen, rather than promote,
competition.69 It compelled utilities that owned transmission lines to offer
service over those facilities on a first-come, first-serve basis to any

Electric Rates?, 24 ENERGY L.J. 65, 66, 88 (2003) (concluding that FERC does not have the authority
under existing law to use market-based rates to set the standard).
64
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC
POWER INDUSTRY: AN UPDATE, at ix, 1 (1996), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/
electricity/056296.pdf; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY: A CAPSULE OF ISSUES AND EVENTS 1 (2000), available at
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/other/booklet.pdf.
65
See Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment
in Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2005); Roger Ridlehoover,
The Role of Entry in Deregulating Gas and Electricity, 19 ENERGY L.J. 307, 310–13 (1998).
66
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 46, at 1324. For an in-depth look at electric restructuring, see
generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN
THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 2–3 (1999).
67
Some would also say flawed. See, e.g., Matthew W.S. Estes, Measuring Market Power with
FERC’s Appendix A Analysis, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 20, 21–24 (2005).
68
Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services
by Public Utilities, Order No. 697, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,904 (July 21, 2007), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶
31,252, order on clarification, 121 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,260 (2007), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-A, 73 Fed.
Reg. 25,832 (May 7, 2008), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,268, order on reh’g, 123 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,055
(2008), order on reh’g, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,055 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-B, 73 Fed. Reg.
79,610 (Dec. 30, 2008), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,285, order on reh’g, Order No. 697-C, 127
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,284 (2009), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-D, 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,206 (2010), order on
clarification, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,021 (2010).
69
See Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act: Policy
Statement, Order No. 592, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595 (Dec. 30, 1996), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,044
(1996), order on reconsideration, Order No. 592A, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,341 (June 19, 1997), 79 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,321 (1997) (Merger Policy Statement); see also FPA Section 203 Supplemental Policy Statement,
72 Fed. Reg. 42,277 (Aug. 2, 2007), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,253 (2007), order on clarification,
122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,157 (2008); Revised Filing Requirements Under Part 33 of the Commission’s
Regulations, Order No. 642, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,983 (Nov. 28, 2000), FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations
Preambles July 1996-Dec. 2000 ¶ 31,111 (2000), order on reh’g, Order No. 642-A, 66 Fed. Reg.
16,121 (Mar. 23, 2001), 94 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,289 (2001).
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customer that wanted access. It sought to ease market entry by clarifying
rules for new generators to interconnect to the power grid.71 And perhaps
most revolutionarily—and certainly most controversially—it began
promoting the coordination of utility operations and power sales through
the formation of “regional transmission organizations,” or “RTOs”:
independent companies that take over system operations for multiple
utilities in an area, seek to centrally coordinate those operations more
efficiently, and thus, make way for larger, more transparent, liquid, and
economic power markets.72
When this flurry of policy activism subsided, a different industry,
operating under a revamped regulatory regime, emerged. Utilities across
the country had sold off their generation assets.73 A bevy of new, largely
natural gas-fired generators had come online.74 Seven RTOs were in
operation, and, although not nationwide, could be found from Maine to
California.75 Market-based, rather than cost-of-service, power contracts

70

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996), F.E.R.C. Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048 (1997),
order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (Dec. 9, 1997), 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,248 (1997),
order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in part sub nom., Transmission
Access Policy Study Group v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d
sub nom., New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
71
Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2003, 104
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,103 (2003), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-A, 106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,220 (2004), order on
reh’g, Order No. 2003-B, 109 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,287 (2004), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-C, 111
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,401 (2005); Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures, Order No. 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,190 (June 13, 2005), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,180
(2005), order on reh’g, Order 2006-A, 113 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,195 (2005), order on clarification, Order
2006-B, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,046 (2006).
72
See Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000), 89
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285, order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 2000), aff’d sub
nom., Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard
Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,327 (Oct. 11, 2002); see also Eisen, supra note 65, at 552–
55; John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L.J.
273, 310 (2004). More recently, FERC has adopted rules governing power markets within RTOs and
ISOs. See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 Fed.
Reg. 64,100, 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071 (Oct. 17, 2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 719-A, 74 Fed. Reg.
37,776, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059 (July 16, 2009), order on reh’g, Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252
(2009).
73
James B. Bushnell & Catherine Wolfram, Ownership Change, Incentives and Plant Efficiency:
The Divestiture of U.S. Electric Generation Plants 5 (Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts., Working
Paper No. CSEM WP 140, 2005), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/csemwp140.pdf.
74
See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 22, at 264; see also Tobey Winters, The Rising
Cost of Electricity Generation, ELECTRICITY J., June 2008, at 57, 58 (explaining that natural gas
combined-cycle generators increased during the 1990s).
75
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, RTO/ISO Map (Printable Version), http://www.ferc.
gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/rto-map.asp (last visited June 17, 2010).
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were now the default, not the other way around.
king.
Well, mostly.
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And competition was

C. Power Forward?: Environmental Electricity
FERC was not in the restructuring business by itself. The FPA
generally limits FERC’s jurisdiction to two key areas: (1) the “transmission
of electric energy in interstate commerce”; and (2) the “sale of electric
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”77 Explicitly reserved to state
regulation are local electricity distribution and retail sales.78 In short,
although FERC has much regulatory power, states do too. Most utilities
are subject to both. As a result, when historically vertically-integrated
utilities began divesting their generation fleets, it was at their states’
Likewise, when the revolution of competition-centered
behest.79
restructuring took its final step into retail markets, that too was because
states called for it.80 FERC may have laid the groundwork for competition
to permeate the electric industry, but it could not finish the job alone.
The problem for full and complete competition, however, was that the
job never was finished. Retail competition, in most states, stalled. The
reasons were manifold. Restructuring did not deliver the lower prices it
promised, or new industry entrants did not appear, or the rules were
fundamentally flawed, or consumers did not care, but either way the result
was the same.81 The move to retail electric competition quickly became
moribund.82 Thus, although competition clearly transformed the electric
76
See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central
Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1349 (1993) (discussing
changes that allowed plants to sell wholesale power at market prices).
77
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006). This historical bright line was modified to a degree in 1992,
when FERC gained “wheeling” and other authority, and more drastically in the Energy Policy Act of
2005, when FERC assumed transmission reliability, heavier enforcement, and additional powers. Id.
§§ 824i–824w (2006).
78
Id. § 824(b)(1), (c)–(e); see also New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1,
20–24 (2002).
79
See Bushnell & Wolfram, supra note 73, at 5.
80
See id.
81
See Weaver, supra note 13, at 139–40; Christopher G. Bond, Note, Shedding New Light on the
Economics of Electric Restructuring: Are Retail Markets for Electricity the Answer to Rising Energy
Costs?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1311, 1311–12 (2001).
82
See Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 18, at 108 (cautioning that one must not “put all your
eggs in one basket” in terms of energy policy). A 2007 FTC report summarized the state of the
transition to retail competition:
In most profiled states, retail competition has not developed as expected for all
customer classes. Few residential customers have switched to alternative providers.
(Exceptions include Massachusetts, New York, and Texas.) In most of the profiled
states, few residential customers have a wide variety of alternative suppliers and
pricing options. . . . To the extent that multiple suppliers serve retail customers,
prices have not decreased as expected, and the range of new options and services is
often limited.
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sector at the wholesale level, that competitive transformation has not, and
very well may never, reach fully down to the everyday consumer.
Today, electricity at the local level remains heavily regulated. State
public utility commissions control the prices that utilities charge retail
consumers, review the “prudence” of their power contracts and generation
acquisition decisions, dictate when and where such facilities may be built,
and involve themselves in utilities’ plans for the kind and amount of
generation sources they use.84 Indeed, even in the wholesale context, the
promise of competition has summoned the specter of inefficiency.
Charges of gaming, allegations of reciprocal dealing, and proof of clear
market manipulation have incited both political and regulatory
backlashes.85 In response, Congress emboldened FERC with powerful new
enforcement authority,86 and FERC in turn has built a complex web of
regulation on top of the competition it says it promotes: pervasive market
rules,87 incentives for installing independent market monitors,88 heightened
enforcement activity,89 and, in certain circumstances, plain limits on
FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS
FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY PURSUANT TO SECTION 1815 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at 6–7
(2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf.
83
See KENNETH ROSE, INST. OF PUB. UTIL., MICH. STATE UNIV., 2004 PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF
ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/
Rose.2004.perf.review.elec.mkts.0804.pdf (“[M]ost states have decided to either discontinue their
efforts to implement retail access or have stopped considering adopting it altogether . . . . In fact, no
state has passed restructuring legislation since June of 2000 . . . . A total of 32 states have repealed,
delayed, suspended or are now no longer considering retail access.”); see also Eisen, supra note 65, at
558 (discussing the decrease in meaningful competition at the state level); James W. Moeller, Of
Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Resources, State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 177–78 (2004) (discussing the decrease in competition after Enron and the
California energy crisis).
84
See Ralph Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and Their
Regulators, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 300 (1986); see also Kevin F. Duffy, Will the Supreme
Court Lose Patience with Prudence?, 9 ENERGY L.J. 83, 84 (1988) (discussing the state commision’s
ability to examine “prudence”).
85
Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4244 (Jan. 19, 2006); see also
Weaver, supra note 13, at 89–108 (discussing legislative changes to FERC’s powers); Heather Curlee,
Note, Examining EPAct 2005: A Prospective Look at the Changing Regulatory Approach of the FERC,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1649, 1678–90 (2006) (reviewing FERC’s new regulatory approach).
86
See 16 U.S.C. § 825o-1 (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717t-1 (2006) (providing authority for
FERC to issue civil penalties under the Natural Gas Act).
87
See, e.g., Amendments to Codes of Conduct for Unbundled Sales Service and for Persons
Holding Blanket Marketing Certificates, 71 Fed. Reg. 9709 (Feb. 16, 2006).
88
AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, CONSUMERS IN PERIL: WHY RTO-RUN ELECTRICITY MARKETS FAIL
TO PRODUCE JUST AND REASONABLE ELECTRIC RATES 32 (2008), available at http://www.appanet.
org/files/PDFs/ConsumersinPeril.pdf; see also John S. Moot, Whither Order No. 888?, 26 ENERGY L.J.
327, 327 n.4 (2005).
89
See Press Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Commission Imposes First Penalties
Under EPAct Authority (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://ferc.gov/news/news-releases/2007/20071/01-18-07-M-3.pdf (reporting an assessment of $22.5 million in civil penalties under a new civil
penalty enforcement authority); see also Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, Statement for the Conference on Enforcement Policy (Nov. 14, 2007), available at
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competition.
The result is that while the move to restructuring
“represents a sharp departure from traditional thinking and historical
practice,”91 the “curious paradox of a market-based regulatory reform is
that we may end up with more rather than less regulation.”92
What these conflicting trends ultimately mean for electricity is unclear,
but the potential range of implications is undeniably important. If electric
power is to move forward, if it is to become something different from what
it is now, policy innovation is necessary. The industry’s strong history of
vertical integration, and the regulatory compact itself, are too engrained to
allow for a new era of energy regulation without a meaningful catalyst.
Environmentalists consistently question how to make electricity cleaner,
more efficient, more sustainable93—how to use energy to promote
environmental goals, a kind of “environmental” electricity, one might
say—but none of these changes are likely to materialize absent political
action of some sort. Consider the results of the industry’s transformation
to date. There was a broad move to competition, and some gains in
economic efficiency as a result,94 but relatively no action on the
environmental front, even when the policy window for making that move
should have been so open.
To be sure, some overtures in this direction have been made. The very
statute that helped kick off the rise of independent power producers, the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”),95 embedded
within its competitive objectives various environmental goals, including
increasing national renewable energy use.96 Partially in response to
PURPA, states increasingly implemented the process of “integrated
resource planning,”97 which can help promote environmentally-friendly

http://www.ferc.gov/news/statements-speeches/kelliher/2007/11-14-07-kelliher.pdf (“It is a personal
priority for me as Chairman to strengthen compliance programs in the regulated community.”).
90
Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services
by Public Utilities, Order No. 697, 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,295, at pp. 404–07 (2007) (recognizing concerns
that FERC’s market-based rates foreclose utilities from competing in their home service territories).
91
David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765,
767 (2008).
92
Tomain, Past and Future, supra note 35, at 474.
93
But see Roy Fuller, Wind Energy Development on BLM Lands, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 613, 616–17 (2004) (noting some environmentalists’ resistance to renewables development).
94
See Blumsack, supra note 19, at 151–52; Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking
Reform of Electricity Markets, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 542 (2005); Tomain, Electricity
Restructuring, supra note 27, at 845–46.
95
Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601–2645 (2006)).
96
E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2006).
97
Section 111 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 required utilities to engage in this process of
planning . . . for new energy resources [by] evaluat[ing] the full range of
alternatives, including new generating capacity, power purchases, energy
conservation and efficiency, cogeneration and district heating and cooling
applications, and renewable energy resources, in order to provide adequate and
reliable service to [the utility’s] electric customers at the lowest system cost.
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energy by requiring utilities to build long-term, forward-looking, publiclyinvolved analyses of their generation portfolios.98 Likewise, different
states have adopted various other measures to make electricity more
sustainable. These include efficiency and conservation incentives, such as
“negawatt” acquisition programs;99 “decoupling” power consumption from
utility profits;100 removing obstacles to small-scale “distributed generation”
located on consumers’ premises;101 creating “system benefit funds;”102 and
eliminating energy-intensive rate structures, such as “declining-block”
rates, that perversely afford consumers lower prices for using more
electricity.103
But despite these efforts, the electric industry’s core is unchanged.
The market and the market players may be different post-restructuring, but
total power consumption grows unabated and the mix of electric generation
fuels, while trending to relatively cleaner natural gas, is not that different
from decades ago.104 For all the regulatory upheaval, the sum revisions,
from an environmental perspective at least, have been on the margins.
Competition alone has not delivered electricity to a new, environmental
state.105 Alternative energies are still “alternative,” not the norm.106

16 U.S.C. § 2602(19); see also id. § 2621(d)(7) (providing that “each electric utility shall employ
integrated resource planning”).
98
See, e.g., Scott F. Bertschi, Comment, Integrated Resource Planning and Demand-Side
Management in Electric Utility Regulation: Public Utility Panacea or a Waste of Energy?, 43 EMORY
L.J. 815, 830 (1994); Cavanagh, supra note 84, at 322–23.
99
See Black & Pierce, supra note 76, at 1354–69.
100
See Sandra Levine & Katie Kendall, Energy Efficiency and Conservation: Opportunities,
Obstacles, and Experiences, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 101, 101 (2006) (asserting that energy efficiency and
conservation decrease pollution and lower overall energy costs); Jeff D. Makholm, “Decoupling” for
Energy Distributors: Changing 19th Century Tariff Structures To Address 21st Century Energy
Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 157, 172 (2008) (discussing the emergence of decoupling and arguing that
decoupling carries the potential to “reduce the frequency of rate cases”).
101
Compare Kristin Bluvas, Comment, Distributed Generation: A Step Forward in United States
Energy Policy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1589, 1614 (2006) (asserting that distributed generation “addresses
major energy problems such as system instability, infrastructure underinvestment, and fossil fuel
dependency”), with Anthony Allen, Comment, The Legal Impediments to Distributed Generation, 23
ENERGY L.J. 505, 522–23 (2002) (discussing the current debate over distributed generation
implementation and arguing that the benefits of distributed generation are “too plentiful, and too
compelling to be overlooked”).
102
Mark Bolinger et al., An Overview of Investments by State Renewable Energy Funds in LargeScale Renewable Generation Projects, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 78, 78.
103
Tomain, Past and Future, supra note 35, at 451–52; see also Shapiro & Tomain, supra note
94, at 508.
104
EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 22, at 42–46.
105
See Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 94, at 542 (“The valuable effort to restructure and reform
electricity markets is not addressed to reducing the pollution and other environmental problems caused
by relying on fossil fuels, particularly coal, to generate electricity.”); Fred Zalcman & David Nichols,
Competition, Environment, and the Electric Industry, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 287, 291 (2001)
(“Restructuring is driven by economic objectives, not environmental concerns.”).
106
See Lincoln L. Davies, Energy Policy Today and Tomorrow—Toward Sustainability?, 29 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 75 (2009) (describing the limited consumption of energy obtained
from alternative sources).
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III. THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE: THE RPS
Of the past decades’ legal innovations seeking to simultaneously
advance energy and environmental objectives, the RPS is perhaps the most
widely adopted. The RPS is at once simple and complex. It is simple in its
concept. The RPS requires electric utilities to ensure that a certain
percentage of retail power they sell comes from renewable resources. The
elegance of this approach is obvious. RPSs harness the power of markets
to allow participants to find the most efficient result themselves.107 RPSs
do not specify the use of a certain fuel, but instead allow utilities to choose
any qualifying renewable fuel based on the characteristics the utility values
most, whether those are price, quantity, duration, intermittency, reliability,
fuel diversity, or any combination thereof.
But the very proviso of what qualifies as “renewable” reveals RPSs’
complexity. Policy questions, such as what counts as renewable, whether
to preference certain technologies, who is subject to the law, how to
measure the RPS requirement, and more, inevitably erect an intricate
regulatory scaffold. This structure becomes even more sophisticated when
questions about how to enforce the RPS come into play. While the RPS
construct is relatively uncomplicated, actually implementing it is much less
so.108
A. Origins and Objectives
RPSs are not new—Iowa adopted the first RPS in the United States in
1983109—but their prevalence is. In 1996, Iowa remained the country’s

107
Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2007, at 10, 16 [hereinafter Rabe, Expanding Role].
108
Robin J. Lunt, Comment, Recharging U.S. Energy Policy: Advocating for a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 371, 381 (2007); cf. Joel B. Eisen, The
Environmental Responsibility of the Regionalizing Electric Utility Industry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 295, 310–12 (2005) (explaining the complexity of accounting for electricity generation
location for RPS purposes).
109
IOWA CODE § 476.44 (2008). In many ways, the RPS is the offspring of PURPA and
integrated resource planning. The RPS finds a precursor in PURPA because both promote increased
renewables use. PURPA required utilities to purchase energy from renewables-based generators at up
to “avoided cost” (or incentive) rates as long as the renewable source had a “production capacity” of
eighty megawatts or less. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17)(a)(ii), 824A-3(a) (2006). The RPS does the same
thing, but without the eighty megawatt restriction, and without tying the purchase requirement to
independent power producers.
The RPS also finds lineage in integrated resource planning because both seek to infuse public
policy into utility planning decisions. “Twenty years ago[, utilities’] process of making resource
decisions was predominantly a function of cost calculation and selection of the ‘least cost’ options.”
Kotzmann, supra note 24, at 21. Integrated resource planning changed this. It imbued utilities’
planning with public input and regulatory involvement, swinging their decisions away from cost alone.
The RPS does the same thing. It injects a publicly-informed substantive mandate into the planning
process, namely, that a portion of the utility’s energy comes from renewables.
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sole RPS adopter. By 1999, the tally had risen to eight. And by 2004, the
figure had more than doubled to eighteen, or half of today’s total.110
Legislatures cite wide-ranging rationales for RPSs. Juxtaposition of
even two states’ approaches illustrate the point. When Iowa adopted its
law in 1983, its legislature cited a policy of “encourag[ing] the
development of alternate energy . . . in order to conserve our finite and
expensive energy resources.”111 By contrast, enacting its RPS in 2006,
Washington declared the need to “promote energy independence[,] . . .
stabilize electricity prices[,] . . . provide economic benefits for Washington
counties and farmers[, and] . . . protect clean air and water,” just to name a
few.112 In short, RPSs initially were adopted as a way “to support
renewable energy development in competitively restructured electricity
markets,” but today politicians view them as serving much broader aims.113
Claiming RPSs as environmental-economic-political cure-alls is
tempting. It is clear that the RPS has “emerged as one of the most
important drivers of renewable energy capacity additions” in the United
States.114 RPSs also can work hand-in-glove with climate change policy to
help reduce greenhouse gas emissions.115 Developing renewable energy
projects likewise promises economic benefits in both technology and
construction, as the recent economic stimulus legislation heavily
anticipates.116 But these benefits are largely ancillary to RPSs’ core
objective: promoting a new energy market in renewables to, in turn, spur
the transition to a sustainably fueled society.
To be fair, RPSs’ ancillary benefits are hardly trivial. One set of
commentators has conceptualized six categories of benefits from
renewable electricity: (1) “[e]nvironmental benefits, including greenhouse
gas mitigation;” (2) price and reliability benefits from a more diverse and
disperse generator mix; (3) preparation, or “readiness,” benefits in the
event of fuel price spikes or supply disruptions; (4) export potential for
renewable technologies; (5) long-run national benefits from energy
independence; and (6) “[s]ustainable-energy-path benefits” such as fossil

110

RABE, RACE TO THE TOP, supra note 11, at tbl.1.
IOWA CODE § 476.41 (emphasis added).
112
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2010).
113
Karlynn S. Cory & Blair G. Swezey, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the States: Balancing
Goals and Rules, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 21, 21.
114
RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT WITH DATA THROUGH 2007, at 2
(2008), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e-revised.pdf.
115
See, e.g., Rabe, Expanding Role, supra note 107, at 11–13 (comparing the motivations of the
Texas and Massachusetts legislatures).
116
See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SUMMARY OF ENERGY RELATED PROVISIONS IN
THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009 (PUBLIC LAW NO.: 111-005), available
at http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/statefed/EnergyProvisions_ARRA.pdf.
111
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117

fuel conservation for later generations.
Benjamin Sovacool and
Christopher Cooper put a slightly different spin on the question,
contending that RPSs help “correct three major failures” in the electricity
markets: electricity pricing’s failure to account for the social costs of
production, unfair competitive advantages for nuclear and fossil fuels from
governmental subsidies, and the “free rider problem” that investors do not
recoup just profits from renewable outlays because everyone benefits from
renewables deployment.118
B. Mechanisms
The state-adopted RPS typically functions in one or two parts. First,
the RPS dictates that certain participants in the retail electricity market,
usually large utilities but sometimes other players as well,119 acquire a
certain percentage of their electricity from renewable sources. This
percentage then ramps up over time, peaking at a statutory target generally
years or decades later. State public utility commissions typically assume
regulatory oversight. Penalties and enforcement mechanisms vary widely,
but the ultimate onus to obtain renewably-fueled power generally rests
with the electricity provider subject to the RPS. In this regard, North
Carolina’s statute is structurally typical of many state RPSs:
Each electric public utility in the State shall be subject to a
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard
(REPS) according to the following schedule:
Calendar Year

REPS Requirement

2012

3% of 2011 North Carolina retail sales

2015

6% of 2014 North Carolina retail sales

2018

10% of 2017 North Carolina retail sales

2021 [on]

12.5% of 2020 North Carolina retail sales120

The second regulatory tool that often—but not always—accompanies
the RPS percentage target is a credit mechanism for “rights” to renewable
power production. That is, rather than actually requiring renewable energy
117
Brent M. Haddad & Paul Jefferiss, Forging Consensus on National Renewables Policy: The
Renewables Portfolio Standard and the National Public Benefits Trust Fund, ELECTRICITY J., Mar.
1999, at 68, 69.
118
Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, State Efforts To Promote Renewable Energy:
Tripping the Horse with the Cart?, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2007, at 5, 5.
119
The electric utility industry is comprised of three core types of providers: investor-owned
utilities (“IOUs”), public-owned utilities (“POUs”), and cooperative entities (“co-ops”). There are far
fewer IOUs than POUs, but IOUs provide roughly seventy-five percent of the electricity consumed in
the United States. All three categories might purchase power from independent power producers
(“IPPs”).
120
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(b)(1) (2010).
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production from each utility, RPSs use RECs as a proxy for their
production requirement.121 The idea is much like environmental law’s
pollution trading schemes.122 Parties can use credits to more efficiently
comply with the RPS. For example, a utility that produces renewable
electricity in excess of its RPS obligation can sell the credits it does not
need to utilities lacking their own renewable facilities. The result is that
the purchasing utilities pay only the market price of the energy itself, not
the presumably higher capital cost of building new facilities. Either way,
the total amount of renewable power produced remains the same. Only the
parties producing it and the cost of doing so change. Both should be more
efficient.123
Design questions abound on how to implement these two relatively
straightforward RPS components. The leading RPS guidebook weighs in
at well over one hundred pages and chronicles no fewer than two dozen
key design issues.124 Apart from fitting an RPS into a state’s existing
regulatory regime, these questions might be reduced to four core RPS
design traits.
First is the trait of the RPS’s aspirational aggressiveness. Is the RPS
mandatory or voluntary? That is, does it compel the addition of renewable
generating facilities, such as in Maine,125 or does it merely push utilities
toward that goal, such as in Utah?126 Is the RPS’s ultimate target
121

Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 22.
Pollution trading schemes allow regulated entities to purchase credits for the “right” to pollute
rather than actually decreasing their pollution. The idea is not only to reach the same overall total
amount of pollution, but also to do so more efficiently than if each company had to reduce the same
share no matter the cost. See, e.g., SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 21, at 104–07 (discussing
emissions allowances policies); E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three Modest
Proposals for the Future of Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245, 247–48, 251–54 (2001)
(describing aspects of market-based approaches to environmental governance); Robert W. Hahn &
Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 15–19 (1991) (explaining four contexts for incentive-based policies in the United
States: emissions, lead, water pollution, and water rights); Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The
Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 37, 80–81 (1998) (concluding that “[e]nvironmental regulation is an excellent example of
interest group politics mediated through legislative and regulatory processes[,]” which, in the context of
the Clean Air Act, resulted in “a major long-term program to reduce pollution using an innovative
tradable emissions permit system”).
123
See Panel, EBA Climate Change Primer: Financing a Renewable Project, 29 ENERGY L.J.
195, 204 (2008); Joseph P. Tomain, Smart Energy Path: How Willie Nelson Saved the Planet, 36
CUMB. L. REV. 417, 449 (2006).
124
NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE (2001), available at http://www.naruc.affiniscape.com/associations/1773/files/rps.pdf; see also
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT GUIDE TO ACTION: POLICIES, BEST
PRACTICES, AND ACTION STEPS FOR STATES 5-1 to 5-2 (2006), available at http://www.chs.ubc.ca/
archives/files/Clean-Energy-Guide.pdf (listing effective policies for “increasing the amount of clean
energy supply”); Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 30–31 (explaining that states can pursue numerous
policy goals when enacting an RPS and explaining that states’ available resources differ, which can
result in states not having uniform RPS policies).
125
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, §§ 3210-A(3), 3210-C(1)(C)(1) (2009).
126
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-17-602(1)(a), 54-7-12(2)(c)(ii) (2009).
122
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aggressive or lax? That is, does the RPS mandate a small amount of new
renewable power, such as Iowa’s 105 megawatt-hour (“MWh”)
requirement,127 or does it call for a real market transformation, such as
Hawaii’s dictate of “[f]orty per cent of its net electricity sales by December
31, 2030”?128
Second, and in part the flipside of its aspirational aggressiveness, is the
RPS’s salience distortion. “Salience distortion” is the term used by
Professor Christopher Peterson to measure the extent to which regulatory
tools stretch the truth about—distort—what they say they accomplish and
what they actually accomplish.129 Although Peterson has used the concept
in credit markets to show how legislative “limits” on payday loan rates
often are dozens of times higher than the way the law expresses them,130
the concept can be used to describe requirements in other areas of the law
as well.131 It applies here. Does the RPS require actual renewable energy,
or does it merely mandate new generation capacity that could go
unused?132 Does it mandate newly constructed generation, or does it dilute
its goal by counting existing resources? Does it apply without exception,
or does it engage in regulatory puffery by allowing, for instance, doublecounting of some resources133 or the reduction of its mandate for others?134
Third is the RPS’s market definition. Because the core RPS objective
is to incentivize renewable technology, the way in which any state’s RPS
defines the renewable market is critical. Is the RPS inclusive or
restrictive? That is, does it count as “renewable” only wind, solar, and
small hydroelectric facilities, or do other new and emerging technologies
qualify as well? Does the RPS give credit to renewable energy produced
anywhere on the grid, or does it limit qualification to in-state sources?
Does it use a credit mechanism, or does it limit eligibility to owned or
purchased power?

127

IOWA CODE § 476.44(2) (2008).
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 269-92(a)(4) (West 2010).
129
Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience
Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1114–15 (2008); see also Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economists, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
1449, 1468 (2003) (discussing the conclusions of studies regarding the detection of and reaction to the
misweighting of information); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1131 (1974) (describing “three heuristics that are employed in
making judgments under uncertainty . . . [which, though] highly economical and usually effective,
[can] . . . lead to systematic and predictable errors”).
130
See Peterson, supra note 129, at 1164.
131
See id. at 1115, 1161 n.223.
132
See, e.g., TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904(a) (Vernon 2010).
133
Many states give extra credit—sometimes as “set-asides,” sometimes as “multipliers”—for
certain resources, especially solar. See WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 16.
134
Some states allow non-renewable resources, such as advanced coal or nuclear, to count. Many
also credit efficiency measures. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(IV) (2009) (efficiency); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 56-576, 56-585.2(B) (West 2009) (nuclear).
128
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Finally, there is the RPS’s planning and enforcement rigor. Beyond
the matter of how high an RPS sets its aim is how well it follows through.
Does the RPS impose significant enforcement penalties, or is it effectively
toothless? If they do comply, what assurance do utilities have that they
will recoup their costs? And how is compliance measured over time? Are
utilities required to submit advance plans explaining how they intend to
comply with the RPS, or is regulatory review triggered only once a
problem emerges?
C. Power Forward?: Environmental Electricity
That so many questions can be raised in the abstract about RPSs’
possible design characteristics should foreshadow the prospect of
incredibly diverse—perhaps even irreconcilable—RPS requirements in the
concrete. Indeed, more than one commentator has pointed to this risk of
hodgepodge regulation as a primary reason for adopting a federal
standard.135
The risks presented by such an internally conflicted regime are not,
however, as straightforward as one initially might think. Whereas car
makers long have fought against the possibility of fifty different tailpipe
emission limits,136 or trucking companies have resisted varying safety
regulations,137 electricity does not function the same way. Automobile
manufacturers need uniform regulation because a vehicle made in
Kentucky might be sold in Mississippi just as easily as in Maine. A longhaul truck traveling from Saginaw to San Francisco likewise cannot
reasonably be expected to change tires, mirrors, or mud flaps every time it
crosses the eight state borders along the way. Electricity is different.
Although the courts repeatedly have recognized that electrons cannot be
traced,138 this does not mean that power produced in Miami can be sold in
Los Angeles. There are three primary power grids in the United States—
the Texas Interconnect, the Eastern Interconnect, and the Western
135
See Lunt, supra note 108, at 405; see also Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper,
Congress Got It Wrong: The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for
Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 92–94 (2008) (providing examples of various disparate
state RPS policies).
136
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv., 17 F.3d 521,
524–25 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the auto industry’s preference for preemption of state emissions
standards by the Clean Air Act); see also William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk,
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1618 (2007); Kirsten H. Engel
& Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 224–25 (2005).
137
See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959) (unique mud flaps);
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 763–64 (1945) (train lengths).
138
See, e.g., New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002)
(recognizing that once energy is placed into the grid, “consumers then draw undifferentiated energy
from that grid” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light
Co., 404 U.S. 453, 458 (1972) (finding that transmitted electricity constitutes interstate commerce).
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Interconnect —and power generally does not flow readily among
them.140 Thus, it would be most unusual for a California utility, for
instance, to have a power sales agreement with a counterpart in Florida.
This fragmentation of the “national” electric grid into multiple parts
means that, presumptively at least, complaints about regulatory conflicts
should not be as strong for a national RPS as it is in other industries. Two
key factors, however, change that calculus.
First, even though the national electrical system is not seamless,141 it is
becoming more so. FERC’s encouragement of RTOs is one factor driving
this trend.142 Another is that utilities often serve customers in multiple
states. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company, for instance, has
subsidiaries that serve customers from Oregon to Illinois and virtually
every state in between.143 American Electric Power serves 5.2 million
customers using 38,953 miles of transmission lines in a 197,500 square
mile service territory that covers parts of Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia.144 Even comparatively small El Paso Electric is not limited
to a single state; it serves both Texas and New Mexico.145 Moreover, some
commentators believe that this trend of multi-state utilities is only likely to
increase because the Energy Policy Act of 2005 largely repealed PUHCA,
which previously had imposed geographic limits on utility mergers.146
Now that those limits are gone, utilities operating in more than one state
may well increase—and face the prospect of needing to comply with
multiple RPSs, a task both costly and inefficient.147
139
The Texas Interconnect covers most of Texas. The Eastern Interconnect encompasses part of
Montana, part of South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, part of Texas, and points east. The
Western Interconnect includes the rest of Montana, the rest of South Dakota, Colorado, New Mexico,
the rest of Texas, and all points west. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Interconnections of the North American
Electric Reliability Council in the Contiguous United States, 1998, http://www.eia.doe.gov/electricity/
page/prim2/fig15.gif (last visited June 17, 2010).
140
Id.; see also PETER C. CHRISTENSEN, RETAIL WHEELING: A GUIDE FOR END-USERS 21 (2d ed.
1996); Erich W. Struble, Comment, National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors: Will State
Regulators Remain Relevant?, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 575, 581 n.32 (2008) (“[T]here is no national
power grid.”).
141
See Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,464 (Aug. 29, 2002) (noting the difficulty
of moving power across seams and the different transmission rules that apply to them).
142
For more on the mechanics of RTO implementation, see generally Clinton A. Vince et al.,
What Is Happening and Where in the World of RTOs and ISOs?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 65 (2006).
143
See MidAmerican Energy, About Us: Facts at a Glance, http://www.midamericanenergy.com/
aboutus2.aspx (last visited June 17, 2010); Pacificorp, Company Quick Facts, http://www.pacificorp.
com/about/co/cqf.html (last visited June 17, 2010).
144
American Electric Power, About Us, http://www.aep.com/about/ (last visited June 17, 2010).
145
El Paso Electric, Service Territory Map, http://www.epelectric.com (follow “About EPE”; then
follow “Service Area”) (last visited June 17, 2010).
146
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1261–1263, 119 Stat. 594, 972–74 (2005).
147
See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Green Means ‘Go?’—A Colorful Approach
to a U.S. National Renewable Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., Aug.–Sept. 2006, at 19, 22. But cf.
Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market Initiatives Are
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Second, even if utilities were not increasingly spanning geographical
boundaries, the risk of conflicting RPSs would still be problematic. The
reason is RECs. RECs change everything. With RECs, the lack of
transmission capacity, or even interconnections, vanish as barriers to RPS
compliance because the California utility that is short on renewable energy
no longer needs to buy wind or solar power from Texas or Florida.
Instead, it could buy an REC from either state, or any other, because RECs
transform the RPS from a strictly regulatory measure to a financial one.
They make geography and grids effectively irrelevant.148
What this means is that the concern over a crazy-quilt RPS regime
must be different from the concern for non-uniform regulation in other
industries. For the RPS, it is only partly about the cost and inefficiency of
complying with conflicting standards. It is much more about fostering
renewables development through an effective and efficient market, a
market where geography does not matter.
This is why, in short, complaints that “fifty state-created and controlled
RPSs” can only create an unwieldy regulatory “patchwork,” with each
state administering its own program and “duplicating efforts and
reinventing the wheel each time,”149 are only partially correct. The real
critique must focus on RPSs’ real objective: its ability to move renewable
power forward, to push this “environmental electricity” past the roughly
ten percent market share it has held since the 1980s.150
It is this critique, in fact, about markets, not just about regulatory and
compliance costs, that forms the foundational argument for a federal RPS.
IV. THE FEDERAL-STATE RPS DEBATE
Despite state RPSs’ rapid emergence, no federal mandate has found
footing. This is not for a lack of effort. More than two dozen federal RPS

Insufficient To Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 338 (2007) (noting
that “PUHCA’s repeal does not eliminate all regulatory obstacles to utility-related mergers and
acquisitions”); Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided
Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 91 n.42 (2008) [hereinafter Michaels, Smart Policy] (pointing out that
state review often is more likely than PUHCA or FPA review to torpedo proposed mergers).
148
That is, of course, “irrelevant” from the perspective of REC trading. From the perspective of
developing new renewables projects, it is well recognized that transmission is a major—and
important—hurdle to deployment. E.g., STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 2:11
(2009).
149
Lunt, supra note 108, at 405; see also Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note
135, at 92–94.
150
This figure refers to generated electricity. The percentage is comparable for generation
capacity. It would be much lower if hydroelectric were excluded. See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW,
supra note 22, at 231, 264. For cumulative energy consumption (not just electricity), renewables
consistently have comprised less than ten percent of the nation’s consumption. Today, the percentage
is actually less than it was in 1949. See id. at 9.
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proposals have been introduced in Congress since 1996.
None has
passed. Although the possibility of a federal RPS is increasingly receiving
more attention, and its odds of adoption seem increasingly likely—an
amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 providing for a federal RPS
passed the Senate,152 and a national RPS was part of the Waxman-Markey
bill that passed the House last year153—the debate over a federal RPS
continues.
The debate has centered more on whether there should be a federal
RPS at all than on what a federal RPS should look like. One of the
proposals currently dominating the stage, in structure, is not much different
from many state initiatives. It would set a twenty percent renewable target
by 2021, with this mandate gradually escalating over time.154 It would
define eligible renewable power to include wind, solar, geothermal,
renewable biomass, and certain hydroelectric sources.155 It would apply to
any retail electric supplier that sells 4,000,000 or more MWh of electricity
per year.156 It would establish a credit system.157 And it would give
enforcement responsibility to FERC.158 So far at least, none of these
details has been the bill’s, or its predecessors’, chief hang-up.
Instead, scholars and law makers have criticized the possibility of a
federal RPS on many fronts, including its potential economic effects, its
alleged inefficiency as a regulatory tool, and its intrusion into areas of
historical state jurisdiction. For their part, RPS proponents have argued for
renewables’ environmental benefits, the likelihood of green collar jobs
from renewables development, and the growing need for energy
independence and security. Together, these clashing views focus the
151
Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need To Mandate Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 27 ENERGY L.J. 451, 452 n.11 (2006). For an account of early national RPS proposals, see
James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Resources, State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio
Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 131–86 (2004).
152
Ralls, supra note 151, at 452–53 n.11 (discussing S. Amend. 791, 109th Cong. (2005)).
153
See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 101(a) (2009)
(proposing to add § 610, a provision for a “Combined Efficiency and Renewable Electricity Standard,”
to PURPA).
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See id. (proposing to amend PURPA, 16 U.S.C. § 2601, by adding § 610(a)(18)(A)–(B)). In
2001, the average annual U.S. household electricity consumption was 10.66 MWh. See ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY REPORT, at tbl.US-1 (2005),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/reps/enduse/er01_us_tab1.html. For comparison purposes,
publicly-owned utilities (e.g., municipals) sold only 14.7% of the electricity in the United States in
2000, but every one of the top ten POUs sold more than 4,000,000 MWh. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF MAJOR U.S. PUBLICLY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES
2000, at 4 tbl.1, 12 tbl.3 (2001), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/electricity/043700.pdf.
Investor-owned utilities sold 75.6% of the electricity consumed that year. Id. at 4 tbl.1.
157
H.R. 2454, § 101(a).
158
Id. § 553(b)(2). A similar proposal is contained in S. 1462, the bill that would be the
American Clean Energy Leadership Act (“ACELA”). See id. § 132(a) (proposing a fifteen percent RPS
for all electric utilities “that sell[] electricity to electric consumers for a purpose other than resale”).
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federal-state RPS debate on three core issues: (1) a federal RPS’s likely
effect on renewable energy markets; (2) its probable jurisdictional impact;
and (3) its “real,” or direct, environmental, economic, and security benefits
and costs.159
A. Renewable Energy Markets
The argument for a federal RPS that receives the least attention is the
one that may be most important. A national standard is necessary to make
the renewables market more liquid, transparent, and uniform. Christopher
Berendt makes the case:
The need for a fluid national [renewables] market has long
been recognized by industry and investors alike. Renewable
energy . . . has high initial capital costs. Thus, it is essential
that . . . investors have reliable information regarding levels
of return from the start of the financing process . . . .
Liquidity for most investment instruments is enabled by two
core factors: (1) a trusted exchange; and (2) a sufficient
trading volume across that exchange. Currently, neither of
these factors [are] present . . . .160
The point is that without a national RPS, what counts as “renewable”
in one state might not count in another. There is no such thing as a
fungible “renewable energy product” today because “renewable” has been
defined so many different ways. State RPSs’ different definitions render
renewable energy less fungible across political boundaries. Thus, the value
of renewable power may turn just as much on how a state’s law reads as on
the product’s salient economic features. A national RPS, these advocates
urge, is needed because a fractured market will not adequately spur
renewable technology development, but a national market would. As
Senator Jeff Bingaman has argued, “There is one thing, however, that a
State standard will not do—it cannot drive a national market for the
technologies . . . .”161
The corollary to this argument is that a federal RPS is needed not only
to increase market uniformity, but also to increase the total amount of
renewable energy production. It is, no doubt, laudable that so many states
have adopted RPSs. But those laws reach only as far as their states’
borders. If the entire nation—instead of seventy percent of it—is subject
159
Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 54, 64 (2006).
160
Christopher B. Berendt, A State-Based Approach to Building a Liquid National Market for
Renewable Energy Certificates: The REC-EX Model, ELECTRICITY J., June 2006, at 54–55 (emphasis
added).
161
153 CONG. REC. S7582, S7598 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
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to an RPS, the aggregate market size for renewables will increase, or at
least it will if the federal requirement is set sufficiently high.162 For a
policy that holds as its primary objective increased renewables
deployment, this is critical. For emerging markets, especially, size
matters.163
The common counterpoint to these arguments is double-pronged.
First, a federal RPS would duplicate pro-renewables efforts. Second, it
would unfairly create regional “winners” and “losers.”164
Mary Ann Ralls makes the first point. She contends that the sundry
state RPSs and various renewable energy purchasing programs and tax and
financial incentives “supplant” the need for a federal RPS.165 Professor
Robert Michaels sounds a similar refrain. Observing that the RPS “is only
one element of a climate conducive to renewable investment,” he argues
that there are better ways to incent technology development.166 “‘Infant
industry’ justifications for supporting renewables development through an
RPS are mostly self-serving politics, and in the event public intervention is
warranted the RPS is a poor instrument for the job.”167
Politicians tend to make the second, “winners and losers” argument
most vociferously.168 The allegation is simple: A federal RPS “amounts to
a wealth transfer” because renewables-poor states will be forced to buy
energy and RECs from renewables-rich states.169 “[O]ne shoe should not
fit every State. States . . . can’t do this because of the unfortunate situation
of nature . . . . [These States] should not be [compelled] . . . to pay a very
big tax . . . .”170 As a result, one design feature that has been a sticking
point for federal proposals is the definition of “renewable.” Advocates of
nuclear, coal, and other technologies, including states rich in these
resources, have played the climate change card to cast the RPS as focused
too narrowly on renewables.171 “I believe very strongly [that] emissionfree nuclear power has simply got to be part of the equation,” Senator Lisa

162
This is a critical point, because a too-low federal RPS would add nothing if set below the
cumulative mandate of existing state laws. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
163
Adam B. Jaffe et al., Technological Change and the Environment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 461, 490 (Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003).
164
Fershee, supra note 23, at 59.
165
Ralls, supra note 151, at 456–58.
166
Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 109.
167
Michaels, Politically Correct, supra note 4, at 10.
168
Fershee, supra note 23, at 59.
169
Id.
170
151 CONG. REC. S6671, S6680 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
171
See Fershee, supra note 23, at 59–60; Ralls, supra note 151, at 453–54; Benjamin K. Sovacool
& Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 15 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 36 (2008).
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172

Murkowski recently declared.
“If the goal is to reduce emissions, why
we would not include nuclear . . . is just beyond me.”173
B. Jurisdiction
A secondary argument in favor of a federal RPS is that it would
eliminate jurisdictional problems created by a multi-state scheme. Most
prominent are Dormant Commerce Clause concerns. Even though the
Commerce Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution,174 as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in its “negative” or “dormant” aspect,
forecloses state protectionism of local resources and businesses,175 a
number of state RPSs favor in-state renewable resources. Arizona, for
instance, gives extra compliance credit to utilities that use certain facilities
installed or built in the state.176 And Ohio flatly preferences in-state
resources: “At least one-half of the renewable energy resources [required
by this RPS] shall be met through facilities located in this state . . . .”177
Commentators have pointed to this trend, alternately, as rendering state
RPSs “constitutionally questionable” and as “the most compelling legal
argument” for a national RPS.178
Related to state RPSs’ Dormant Commerce Clause dilemma is the
problem of regulatory “leakage.”179 Leakage is a “common challenge” for
policies aimed at social ills.180 When, for instance, a state heightens
pollution limits or a municipality ramps up drug enforcement, polluters and
drug sellers may simply “relocate to other jurisdictions” to continue their
activities.181 This phenomenon is known in the environmental arena as the

172
Katherine Ling, Senate Committee Repels Effort To Strike Renewable Provision, GREENWIRE,
May 21, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/05/21/2/.
173
Id.
174
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
175
E.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359
(1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263,
272 (1984); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).
176
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D), (E) (2008).
177
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3) (West 2000).
178
Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 125–26; Brian E. Maxted,
Note, Developing Wind Power in the Commonwealth: No Longer a Quixotic Quest To Build Wind
Farms in Virginia, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 319, 338 (2008); see also Kirsten H.
Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case
of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 316 (1999); Steven Ferrey, Renewable Orphans:
Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2006, at 52, 55–60;
Patrick Jacobi, Note, Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How States
Can Stop Worrying and Learn To Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. L. REV. 1079, 1096–
1107 (2006).
179
Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,653, 10,654 (2007).
180
Id. at 10,655.
181
Id.
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“race-to-the-bottom” because it can encourage neighboring jurisdictions to
regulate less stringently.182
Leakage, however, also can be a problem for policies that do not
attempt to eliminate social evils but instead seek to attract socially
beneficial activities. In the case of renewable energy, if Missouri, for
example, adopted an RPS but Tennessee, Arkansas, and Nebraska did not,
the risk would be that Missouri’s law would fail to change the market. The
total amount of renewable generation might not increase—or would not
increase as much as Missouri sought—because rather than building their
own facilities, Missouri utilities would import power from existing
generators in surrounding states.183 This may well be some states’
rationale for favoring in-state renewables, despite the constitutional
problems of doing so.184 A federal RPS, however, solves both problems.
It removes the need—perceived or real—for state protectionism. And, as
long as the standard is set high enough,185 a federal RPS compels a total net
increase in renewables.
The main rebuttal to these jurisdictional arguments is the claim that a
federal requirement would intrude on state authority. To be sure, the
“[n]eed for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and
services, are areas that have been characteristically governed by the
States.”186 It is, in fact, the structure the FPA ensures,187 and on this basis,
voices against a federal RPS have been loud indeed. Commenting on the
proposed Energy Policy Act of 2005, the White House declared: “The
Administration would oppose . . . a national renewable portfolio
standard . . . and believes these standards are best left to the States. A
national RPS could raise consumer costs, especially in areas where these
resources are less abundant and harder to cultivate or distribute.”188 More
recently, the National Association of Manufacturers and the electric utility
industry’s trade association, the Edison Electric Institute, issued a joint
press release urging the same point. “[S]tates and their utilities—not the
182
Compare Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It
“To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 278–85 (1997) (arguing that a race-to-the-bottom exists,
resulting in reduction of state welfare and a need for federal regulation), with Richard L. Revesz, The
Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV.
535, 538–40 (1997) (challenging the race-to-the-bottom theory as a need for federal regulation).
183
See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1532 (2007).
184
Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and
Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal
Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 264–68 (2008).
185
See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
186
Pac. Gas & Electricity Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190,
205 (1983).
187
For a discussion on the FPA, see supra Part II.B.
188
Statement of Administration Policy, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President,
H.R. 6—Energy Policy Act of 2005 (June 14, 2005), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=24834.
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federal government—should be allowed to make their own fuel choices . . .
. If ever there was a case in which one size doesn’t fit all, this is it . . . .”189
Members of Congress likewise have argued that a national RPS would be
“in the spirit of an unfunded Federal mandate, the kind of thing that a lot of
us were elected to stop, the idea of coming up with a big idea here in
Washington and imposing it on the rest of the country.”190
C. Benefits and Costs
Despite the breadth of contentions for and against a federal RPS,
arguments over the proposal’s likely benefits and costs have dominated the
scene.
Proponents insist a national RPS will deliver on all its
environmental, economic, and security promises without deleterious price
impacts. RPS opponents, on the other hand, contend that there are more
effective ways to advance RPS goals, that its promises are empty, and that
it will impose unnecessary, exorbitant price hikes on consumers. “It is
hard to imagine any environmental policy,” Professor Michaels contends,
“that delivers as little in theory as a national RPS, [especially when] the
experiences of the states show that it delivers equally little in practice as
well.”191
1. Environmental
Key among the federal RPS’s offered benefits are its potential
environmental effects. As Senator Jim Jeffords has argued, “A renewables
requirement would dramatically reduce carbon emissions from
powerplants. It would also significantly reduce emissions of sulfur and
nitrogen oxides. These pollutants contaminate our water, cause smog and
acid rain, and contribute to respiratory illnesses.”192 Other commentators
are even more emphatic. “[A] national RPS would be designed primarily
to correct market distortions.”193 It would eliminate the “environmental
and social costs associated with the mining, processing, transportation,
combustion and clean-up of fossil and nuclear fuels.”194
Water
195
consumption should decrease, as should overall pollution. “There is
simply no logical way to crunch the numbers such that renewable
generation induced by a national RPS would not decrease pollutants from
189

Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. & Edison Elec. Inst., U.S. Manufacturers and Electric
Companies Remain Firmly United Against Federal ‘Renewable Portfolio Standard,’ (Aug. 2, 2007),
available at http://www.eei.org/newsroom/pressreleases/Press%20Releases/070802.pdf.
190
151 CONG. REC. S6676 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Alexander).
191
Michaels, Politically Correct, supra note 4, at 10.
192
151 CONG. REC. S6682 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
193
Christopher Cooper, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just
Plain Correct?, ELECTRICITY J., June 2008, at 9, 10.
194
Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 127.
195
Id. at 127–28.
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levels they would otherwise be in the absence of renewables.”
Opponents of a federal RPS do not contend that the law will fail to
yield environmental benefits. Rather, they argue that there are more
efficient—and effective—ways of pursuing the goal. Professor Michaels
has been most vocal on this front, though others also have sounded the
alarm.197
Michaels claims that a national RPS will “reduce[] emissions at higher
cost than necessary” for two reasons.198 First, he argues that renewables
will not create a “one-for-one” reduction in air pollution because
renewable generation does not run as often as conventional facilities.199
Utilities typically dispatch generation in “merit order,” meaning that they
run the least expensive generation first, taking into account operational
considerations that may limit that preference.200 Renewables thus are more
likely to displace natural gas-fired generators than, say, coal plants,
because natural gas facilities typically price higher in the generation stack
than coal or nuclear.201 Second, Michaels finds RPSs inefficient for failing
to treat energy efficiency measures “symmetrically” with the addition of
renewables.202 Demand-side measures like efficiency improvements
reduce just as much pollution as renewables but cost less because no new
facility has to be built. Michaels thus sees RPSs’ failure to promote
efficiency as a key design flaw.203
The companion of these claims is the view that other tools can promote
renewables better than an RPS. Here, the primary contender is the socalled “feed-in tariff,” which numerous European and other nations have
adopted.204 The feed-in tariff is effectively the RPS’s mirror image.
Rather than using the stick of a minimum renewables threshold, the feed-in
tariff employs the carrot of a guaranteed price and, often, a purchase
196

Christopher Cooper & Benjamin K. Sovacool, All Flash, No Light: The Kabuki Dance
Opposing a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., Nov. 2008, at 41, 46.
197
See id. at 46.
198
Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 81.
199
Id. at 87. The percentage of time that a generation facility runs is referred to as the facility’s
“capacity factor.” Most renewable resources, and especially solar and wind, have lower capacity
factors than “baseload” facilities, such as nuclear and coal, that tend to run all the time because they are
needed to meet minimum system demand. In 2007, the average capacity factor for nuclear plants was
91.8%; for coal, 73.6%; for natural gas combined cycle, 42%; for hydroelectric conventional, 36.3%;
and for other renewables, 40%. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER
ANNUAL 2008, at tbl.5.2 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf.
200
Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications,
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1297 (1999).
201
See Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 86–87.
202
Id. at 87.
203
Id. at 84.
204
See Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-In Tariffs To Meet U.S.
Renewable Electricity Targets, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 73, 73–74 (“As of January 2007, eighteen
European Union countries, Brazil, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Nicaragua, Norway, Sri Lanka,
Switzerland, and Turkey, along with several states and provinces, had adopted feed-in tariffs.”).
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205

obligation. Under the former German program Stromeinspeisungsgesetz,
for instance, renewable generators selling their power into the wholesale
market were guaranteed a price of ninety percent of the retail rate.206 This
kind of price stability has given feed-in tariff advocates room to argue that
these tools are more effective than RPSs in achieving renewables
deployment because they eliminate investor risk.207 “Because the [feed-in
tariff] ties the payment to a particular project, the risk is removed for that
project. Because the [RPS] ties the payment to an amount of generation,
projects carry risks in terms of price, volume and market for all
generators.”208
2. Security
RPSs’ asserted security benefits are twofold—one systematic, one
sociopolitical. The potential systematic benefit is improved infrastructure
reliability.209 This may follow from the mere addition of renewables into
the generation mix. By definition, a more diverse energy portfolio should
be more reliable than a homogenous one because there are more, and
different, resources to replace an offline generator.210 Moreover, because
of their smaller size, it should be easier to fill in for renewables generators
205
See id. at 73 (“[F]eed-in tariffs require utilities to provide renewable generators with a longterm fixed price for electricity . . . . Most feed-in tariffs also require utilities to interconnect all eligible
renewable generation . . . .”).
206
Id. at 74. Germany has since changed the tariff so that it is fixed rather than tied to retail
prices. The new program is the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz. Id.
207
See, e.g., MARIO RAGWITZ ET AL., FRAUNHOFER INST. SYS. & INNOVATION RESEARCH,
MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS TO SUPPORT RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY IN
EU MEMBER STATES 1 (2005), available at http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
Miguel/Ragwitz_monitor_pol_instr.pdf (“The effectiveness of the promotion of innovative
technologies like wind energy, agricultural biogas and photovoltaics has been the highest in countries
having feed-in tariffs as their main support system, even though not all feed-in countries are equally
successful.”); Paul Gipe, Renewable Energy Policy Mechanisms 56 (Feb. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Miguel/Gipe_RE_Policy_Mechs.pdf (“Both
Quota systems and Renewable Tariffs can be made to work effectively . . . . However, only Renewable
Tariffs have a consistent record of offering equitable opportunity to all willing participants in the
market while simultaneously stimulating rapid rates of growth in renewable generation.”).
208
C. Mitchell et al., Risk, Innovation and Market Rules: A Comparison of the Renewable
Obligation in England and Wales and the Feed-In System in Germany 20, available at
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Miguel/Bauknecht_Mitchell_Connor__2002
__Risk__Innovation_and_Market_Rules_-_A_Comparison_of_the_RO_and_the_EEG.pdf; see also
NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 417 (2006) (“Both sets of
instruments have proved effective but existing experience favours price-based support
mechanisms . . . . Central to this is the assurance of long-term price guarantees.”); Janet L. Sawin,
National Policy Instruments: Policy Lessons for the Advancement & Diffusion of Renewable Energy
Technologies Around the World 27 (Int’l Conference for Renewable Energies Conference Thematic
Background Paper, 2004), available at http://www.renewables2004.de/pdf/tbp/TBP03-policies.pdf.
209
See, e.g., Fershee, supra note 23, at 66–68; Maxted, supra note 178, at 337–38; Sovacool &
Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 112–18; see also 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(7) (2006)
(discussing the statutory regulations that utility companies must follow).
210
Sovacool & Cooper, Green Means ‘Go?’, supra note 147, at 27; see also Sovacool & Cooper,
State Efforts, supra note 118, at 6–7 (noting that renewables-based generators require less downtime
for maintenance and repairs than conventional power plants).

2010]

POWER FORWARD: THE ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL RPS

1373

that go offline. Then-Senator Barack Obama touted this attribute of
renewables from a terrorism perspective: “Introducing renewable
electricity . . . brings us a measure of physical security . . . [namely],
smaller targets and reduc[ed] transport of combustible materials.”211
The other oft-cited security benefit of renewables is in many ways the
Holy Grail of American energy policy: energy independence. The idea is
obvious. If we can use renewables to abandon fossil fuels, we can gain
self-sufficiency rather than importing over a quarter of our national energy
supply from politically unstable, oligopolist states.212 It is the followthrough on this simple aim that has proven more problematic. Politicians
have long touted energy independence as the rationale for a host of energy
policies,213 yet we remain woefully short of the target.214 Now, with a
proposed national RPS on the table, the rationale has reemerged. “[W]e
are talking about whether we can get the United States to energy
independence,” then-Senator Ken Salazar implored, “whether we can set
America free from being held hostage to the importation of foreign oil
from Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia . . . .”215
In response to these professed security advances, RPS naysayers point
to practicalities. They argue that mass renewables deployment will make
the electricity system less reliable, because more important than
diversification is renewables’ Achilles’ heel—their “non-dispatchability.”
System operators cannot turn renewables-based generators on and off as
they can with some fossil-fired units, because the sun, wind, and waters
cannot be tamed.216 This, they say, means less reliability, not more. They
211
151 CONG. REC. S6671, S6690 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Obama); see also
AMORY B. LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS, BRITTLE POWER: ENERGY STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY 264–69, 284–89 (1982); Cooper, supra note 193, at 15 (arguing that renewables may help
ease transmission siting); Alan Nogee et al., The Projected Impacts of a National Renewable Portfolio
Standard, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 33, 43; Sovacool & Cooper, Green Means ‘Go?’, supra note
147, at 27 (contending that renewables benefit society by subjecting the utility industry to fewer “fuel
interruptions and shortages”).
212
The Energy Information Administration estimates that in 2008 the United States consumed
99.481 quadrillion Btus of primary energy and had net imports of 25.936 quadrillion Btus. The vast
majority of imports are oil, natural gas, and petroleum products. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 3 tbl.1.1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
mer/pdf/mer.pdf.
213
See, e.g., Davies, Energy Policy, supra note 106, at 78.
214
For commentary on the idea of energy independence as impractical, unachievable, and
inefficient, see, for instance, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37
ENVTL. L. 595, 596 (2007); John J. Fialka, Energy Independence: A Dry Hole?, WALL ST. J., July 5,
2006, at A4; Tom Kenworthy, Energy Independence May Be a Pipe Dream, USA TODAY, Oct. 25,
2004, at 17A.
215
151 CONG. REC. S6671, S6684 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Salazar); see also
153 CONG. REC. E1788 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Schakowsky); 153 CONG. REC.
E311 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2007) (statement of Rep. Udall); 153 CONG REC. S7680, S7689 (daily ed. June
14, 2007) (statement of Rep. Cantwell); 153 CONG. REC. S7582, S7597 (daily ed. June 13, 2007)
(statement of Sen. Bingaman); Ralls, supra note 151, at 471.
216
Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges To Accommodate New
Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 986–96 (2009); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of
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note that moving to renewables demands huge investments in a new
transmission system, because areas where renewables are found are so
disperse.217 And, they contend that focusing on renewables as a cure to the
United States’ foreign oil addiction is myopic for failing to take advantage
of other domestically available energy sources such as nuclear, coal, and
Alaska oil, among others.218
3. Economic
Perhaps the most tested battleground over a national RPS’s wisdom is
its likely economic effects.219 Both advocates and opponents come heavily
armed to the debate. The result, a virtual cacophony of data: “[A] 15%
[RPS] would save the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors $16.3
billion in electricity and natural gas costs.”220 But a national RPS would be
“an $18 billion new tax on ratepayers to build tens of thousands of
windmills and to spend $11 billion on solar power, which would produce
one-fifth of 1% of all the electricity we need by 2025.”221 A 15% RPS,
however, would “result in a savings in variable costs for electricity of $240
billion by 2026”—“far more than offsetting the $134 billion increase in
Yet, it would increase
capital expenditures” it would require.222
“electricity prices by . . . $12.8 billion . . . by 2030,”223 “rais[ing] our taxes,
[raising] our electric rates, [running] away jobs, [and ruining] our
mountaintops. That is not the kind of choice we like to have.”224
The basis of RPS proponents’ claims is that shifting to renewables can
save money in a number of ways—namely, by lowering natural gas prices
through reduced demand, by replacing conventional generation with
renewable capital investments that are cheaper “over the expected lifetimes
of the plants,” and, eventually, by lowering renewable energy’s own cost
through technology advancement and economies of scale.225 According to
one study, these impacts, taken together, could lead to consumer savings of
between $27 and $49.1 billion by 2020 under a 20% national RPS, and
Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1041–42 (2009); see also
Gunnar Birgisson & Erik Petersen, Renewable Energy Development Incentives: Strengths, Weaknesses
and the Interplay, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2006, at 40, 42 (noting the nondispatchable nature of wind as
an impediment to renewables development).
217
Fershee, supra note 23, at 67–68; Michaels, Politically Correct, supra note 4, at 12; Robert J.
Michaels, Renewable Portfolio Standards: Still No Good Reasons, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2008, at 18,
20; see also Ann E. Carlson, Implementing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Caps: A Case Study of the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1479, 1493–94 (2008) (noting
transmission development as a barrier to renewables).
218
151 CONG. REC. S6671, S6682 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
219
Fershee, supra note 23, at 73.
220
153 CONG. REC. S7594 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Reed).
221
151 CONG. REC. S6677 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Alexander).
222
153 CONG. REC. S7598 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
223
153 CONG. REC. S7611 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Voinovich).
224
153 CONG. REC. S7506 (daily ed. June 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Alexander).
225
Nogee et al., supra note 211, at 38.
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between $22.6 and $37.7 billion by 2025 under a 10% mandate.
This is
on top of a projected net increase of 157,480 jobs under a 20%
requirement, or 91,220 jobs under a 10% mandate.227
Others, however, take issue with these claims. They argue that the
models used to estimate such economic paybacks are flawed, that they
ignore the significant transmission costs of new renewables facilities, that
using regulation to force on society technologies that cannot cut it on their
own in the market is akin to “throwing away part of the labor force,” and
that the more likely outcome is not more jobs for America, but imported
cheap labor from overseas.228
Ultimately, the problem with the assertions of both national RPS
backers and dissenters is that they must rely on assumptions—projections
and estimates, not actual evidence. “Since 1997, at least 18 studies have
been completed on various [federal] RPS scenarios.”229 Not one, however,
has been able to examine real world outcomes, a world in which a national
RPS applies.
V. THE FEDERAL-STATE EVIDENCE (SO FAR)
Although the impact of a federal RPS remains academic, experience
with state measures provides a hard, if partial, record on which to weigh
the possibility of taking the RPS national. The record yields three key
observations. State measures have in fact severely fragmented the
renewables market by using widely differing eligibility criteria and, more
problematically, limitations on RECs.
State RPSs also erect
geographically-based renewables trade barriers at an alarming rate.
Finally, state RPSs have varied widely in both their delivered benefits and
costs, and in their design.
In short, if a national RPS is well-designed,230 it may have much to
offer by eliminating the regulatory complexity the state-based regime has
produced. Although many anti-federal RPS arguments focus on whether
there should be RPSs at all, the reality is that most states already have such
laws in place. As a practical matter, the real question thus becomes
whether a new federal regime or the de facto state milieu will better carry
out the RPS’s objectives. A federal law would better advance the primary
RPS goal of creating a robust, liquid market for renewables, and it may
also better deliver the environmental, security, and economic benefits that
RPSs potentially offer.
This Part assesses the record of state RPS performance thus far. It uses
226

Id. at 39.
Id. at 42.
See, e.g., Michaels, Politically Correct, supra note 4, at 13–14, 16–18.
229
Nogee et al., supra note 211, at 35.
230
See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
227
228
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a trio of tools, one existing and two new, to do so. The new tools are a
thirty-six-jurisdiction survey of state RPSs that was performed for this
Article231 and the application of a four-dimensional original metric for
measuring RPS design. The metric works by taking each of the RPS
design attributes delineated above232 and scoring the attributes on a scale of
0 to 5. Blended in with these two new methodologies is the existing tool,
available data on state RPS effects.
A. Renewable Energy Markets
States generally agree that most of what might be called the “core”
renewable resources count toward their RPSs. Thus, all thirty-six states
surveyed give credit for wind, biomass, methane, and photovoltaic solar
generators, and virtually all—thirty-five of thirty-six—give credit for
thermal solar generation. After that, however, uniformity withers. Only
twenty-nine states count geothermal as a qualifying renewable resource,
only twenty-three accept ocean and tidal energy, and a mere thirteen count
renewables-based cogeneration.233 In other words, although the existing
state-based RPS regime creates common ground for many renewables, it
also clearly advantages some technologies over others—ensuring that there
is no single “renewable product” across state lines.

231

The survey reviewed state RPS statutes and, in some cases, implementing regulations. It is
current through October 2009. The Appendices summarize the survey; the full data are on file with
author.
232
See supra Part II.B.
233
See infra Appendix A. Treatment of cogenerators is difficult. Cogeneration admittedly is an
efficiency, rather than renewable, technology. It is included as a measure of market definition because
a number of states specifically contemplate that renewables may be co-fired with other materials, often
in cogeneration facilities. Nevertheless, because cogeneration is primarily an efficiency technology,
the efficacy tendency scoring metric also takes RPSs’ inclusion of cogeneration into account in
measuring salience distortion. See infra Appendix F.
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Figure 1: Qualifying Renewables by Number of States

This lack of uniformity becomes even more apparent when states’
treatment of specific resources is considered. A number of states—no less
than sixteen—give “credit multipliers” to certain renewables, thus
preferencing those resources over others.234 The rationale for this approach
is to help spark the chosen technologies’ development.235 Whether such an
approach is justified, however, is immaterial to the key federal-state
question: product uniformity. Thus, when Virginia, for instance, gives
“double” the normal RPS credit for solar and wind facilities, those
resources suddenly assume enhanced value, and an uneven playing field
emerges.236 Indeed, many of these credit multipliers are significant.
Colorado gives triple credit for solar energy, Delaware allows a 350%
credit for off-shore wind, Utah affords a 240% multiplier for in-state solar
facilities, and Arizona offers multiple bonuses that can be added up to
double credit based on facility installation date and type.237
A similar phenomenon has developed with respect to hydroelectricity.
Every RPS state counts hydroelectric power, but the restrictions and
limitations on this resource are so varied that there simply is no uniform
“RPS-eligible” hydroelectric product. Arizona requires post-2005 facilities
to be 10 MW or less.238 California allows facilities under 30 MW that do
234

See infra Appendix B.
Rickerson et al., supra note 204, at 82.
VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(C) (2007).
237
See infra Appendix B.
238
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE §§ R14-2-1802(A)(4)(a)–(b), (9)(a)–(c) (2008).
235
236
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239

not impact “instream beneficial use.”
Maine credits facilities under 100
MW.240 And so on.
Nor has the state RPS regime created a uniform renewable energy
credit scheme. Rather, although virtually all state RPSs provide for REC
use, their implementation varies even more widely than their definitions of
“renewable.”241 This is important because RECs are what can make the
renewables market most functional. Their very purpose is to enhance
efficiency by (1) creating a larger, more liquid market and (2) giving
electricity providers greater options for compliance. However, while many
states specify that one REC equals one MWh of renewables-generated
electricity,242 at least three define an REC as one kilowatt-hour of
electricity.243 This is akin to saying that a dime found in Arizona can be
exchanged for $100 in Texas.244 Making matters worse, states give their
RECs different shelf lives.245 Some states, like Arizona, put no expiration
date on their RECs. Others, like Colorado, give them somewhat longer
shelf lives, five years for instance. In between, the array of choices is
wide.246 Add the fact that what qualifies as “renewable” in the first place
already varies, and that different regions have begun developing different
REC-tracking platforms,247 and the lack of uniformity across jurisdictions
becomes readily obvious.

239

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.12(c)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2010).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A § 3210(2)(C)(2)(f) (2009).
Hawaii’s statute does not utilize RECs, for perhaps obvious reasons. New York currently does
not allow credit use, and Iowa’s law merely authorizes state regulators to “establish or participate” in
an REC program. See IOWA CODE § 476.44a (2008); N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Establishing
New RPS Goal and Resolving Main Tier Issues, Case 03-E-0188, at 24 (Jan. 8, 2010), available at
http://documents.dps.state.ny.us/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={30CFE590-E7E1-473BA648-450A39E80F48}.
242
E.g., 723-3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 3652(n) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 352(16) (2009).
243
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1803(A) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.78215(1) (2009); N.M.
STAT. § 62-16-5(A) (2009).
244
Obviously, a kind of “exchange rate” system could easily solve such a problem. That the
problem exists, however, underscores the effect that different RPS requirements have on a uniform
REC market.
245
Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 23.
246
See infra Appendix C. Some statutory RPSs do not specify shelf lives for RECs; some also
leave it to the discretion of the implementing agency. The Michigan PSC, for instance, has proposed a
three-year shelf life for RECs in that state, but that rulemaking remains open as this Article goes to
press. See In re Rules Governing Renewable Energy Plans and Energy Optimization Plans, 2010 WL
1820876 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 27, 2010) (proposing Rule 460.224, which would mandate
that RECs “shall not be available for compliance retirement for any month later than 36 months after
the month in which the credits were generated”). Figure 2 excludes such states.
247
See Fershee, supra note 23, at 69–70 (discussing ISO and RTO tracking systems for RECs);
see also Lori Bird & Elizabeth Lokey, Interaction of Compliance and Voluntary Renewable Energy
Markets, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 18, 20–21.
240
241
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Figure 2: REC Shelf Lives by Number of States

Indeed, one recent study concluded that state RPSs have “fragmented”
the REC market.248 REC prices vary “substantially across regions and
resource types” because of differing “resource eligibility rules,” supply
perceptions, “and/or hoarding of [credits] by some parties.”249 A national
RPS should ameliorate these effects. A uniform REC market would
replace the fractured one that exists today. Then, when one area lacked
sufficient renewable energy at any given time, it could purchase available
credits from another.250 In other words, a more economically efficient
equilibrium should occur. Federal competition should not just make REC
prices more uniform; it should drive them down.251
B. Jurisdiction
The evidence weighs even more clearly in favor of a national RPS
from a jurisdictional perspective. State RPSs include a surprising number
of geographic limits on eligible generation. More than three-quarters of
RPS states impose some kind of geographic limitation on generation
eligibility: thirty-one of the thirty-six RPS states, or eighty-six percent.
To be fair, not all of these restrictions are equally onerous. Some
248

See WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 26.
Id. at 27–28.
See Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 107.
251
See Pallab Mozumder & Achla Marathe, Gains from an Integrated Market for Tradable
Renewable Energy Credits, 49 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 259, 270 (2004).
249
250
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confine eligible power sources only to the state’s region, obviously much
less troublesome than a limit that cuts eligibility off at the state border.252
A number of states, such as Ohio and Illinois, impose a flat preference for
in-state power, while others, such as Minnesota and New Mexico, take a
weaker approach, merely encouraging RPS implementation with an eye
toward state-centered benefits.253 Still others take a less direct approach
that has the same practical effect as a flat preference: awarding credit
multipliers to facilities, or certain facility classes, located in-state.254 No
matter which way states structure their preferences, however, the outcome
is the same. RPSs that favor in-state or in-region generation splinter the
market and stunt trade. They limit renewables’ overall value by making
them worth less in one jurisdiction than another, and they diminish the
national commitment to renewables by curbing their trade.
Figure 3: Geographic Limits on RPS-Eligible Power

The effect of these geographic limits is amplified by their application
to RECs as well. At least eighteen states do this, with ten restraining REC
use or eligibility by their local region, and eight more either giving extra
weight to RECs derived from in-state power or restricting REC use to their
states’ boundaries.255 But limiting where RECs can be used risks gutting
252

Endrud, supra note 184, at 272–73.
See infra Appendix D.
254
See id.
255
States that limit or modify REC value by region include California, Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, as well as the
District of Columbia. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.12(c), (f) (West 2010); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
25741(b) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a(b) (2009); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1431(10), 34253
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the mechanism’s very purpose: to harness the market to make RPSs more
efficient, not less.
Indeed, virtually every state that imposes geographic limits on RPS
qualification has potential trading partners in its immediate neighbors.
Yet, quite troublingly, these states have erected geographic barriers
nevertheless. All but one state with an in-state preference—Delaware—
border a non-RPS state. And all but three of these states border two or
more non-RPS states.256 This implies that state RPSs’ geographic limits
likely restrain trade, because without those limits, developers might find it
more cost-efficient to build a facility, for instance, just inside Wyoming’s
non-RPS border and transmit the power into the Colorado RPS market.257
Thus, states’ geographic restrictions put their RPSs at war with themselves.
By seeking to prevent leakage on their percentage targets, they undermine
the very markets they seek to build.

1432 (2010); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. §§ 7-701(i), 7-703(d) (LexisNexis 2010); 225 MASS.
CODE REGS. 14.07(2)(c) (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(IV) (2010); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§
14:8-2.8(c), 14:8-2.9 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 469A.145 (2010); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1648.3(e),
1648.4 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(d) (2010). States that do so on the basis of the REC’s
production in-state include Arizona, Delaware, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Utah, and West Virginia. See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
26, § 356 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.1039(2)(d)–(e) (West 2010); N.M. ADMIN. CODE §
17.9.572.13(C)(2) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-5(c) (2010);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-17-603(6)(a) (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24-2F-4(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2010).
256
Compare DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Renewable
Portfolio Standards (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/SummaryMaps/
RPS_map.ppt, with National Public Radio, Visualizing the U.S. Electric Grid, http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=110997398 (last visited June 17, 2010) (visually comparing states
that have RPSs with transmission lines). A more sophisticated assessment of these geographic barriers’
effect on REC trading is an area for further study. Examining transmission paths—and available
transmission capacity—would be a necessary part of such an undertaking. Here, a more simplified
approach of geographic boundaries, rather than transmission interconnections, was used. In this tally,
states with voluntary RPSs were counted as “non-RPS” states for leakage purposes, because a state
with a non-binding goal presumably should be comparably more willing to trade power into a state
with a mandatory RPS. Such states, however, are also counted as “RPS states” for purposes of
counting those states with geographic restraints on trade, because their non-binding RPSs should create
at least some pull on renewable-based power into their borders.
257
Wyoming does not currently have an RPS, and Colorado grants 1.25 RECs (rather than 1
REC) for energy generated in-state. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(c)(III) (2009); see also DSIRE:
Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards (June 2010),
available at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pptx. “Likely” is intentional
here, because the mere fact that a transmission line runs into a state says nothing about whether there is
available capacity on the path, or if there is energy available for purchase on the other end. At the same
time, referencing only immediately neighboring states is conservative because power also could be
acquired from a non-RPS state located many states away, and neither Canada nor Mexico are
accounted for here even though they have interconnections with portions of the United States grid.
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Table 1: Number of Non-RPS States Bordering RPS Jurisdictions
with In-State Preferences
State with In-State
RPS Preference

Neighboring Non-RPS /
Voluntary RPS States

Delaware

0

Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Hampshire

1

Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Mexico, Utah,
West Virginia

2

Ohio, Texas

3

Colorado, Missouri, North Carolina

4

C. Benefits and Costs
The debate over a federal RPS’s likely benefits and costs is perhaps
most remarkable for its focus. It is much less about whether a national
RPS will deliver renewables’ benefits better than the existing array of state
laws than it is about whether there should be renewables-promoting laws at
all. This is particularly true on the environmental front, where RPS
opponents concentrate on the laws’ efficiency rather than their efficacy.258
Still the question remains: Do RPSs really provide the benefits they
promise?
On this count, the jury remains out. Because state RPSs are so young,
the majority of studies examining their (likely) impacts are prospective.259
Even if experience were longer, however, teasing out precise macro-social
and -economic effects of any law, particularly one that seeks to reinvent
258
See, e.g., Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 84–88 (providing an overview of efficient
environmental regulation). One recent study found that, fifteen years after inception, a single state’s
RPS would save over 145,000 tons per year in SOx emissions, 71,000 tons per year in NOx emissions,
and over 31 million tons per year in CO2 emissions. ATHANASIOS D. BOURNAKIS ET AL., THE
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF CLEAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN ILLINOIS 65–67
(2005),
available
at
http://www.erc.uic.edu/PDF/Clean_Energy_Development.pdf.
Some
commentators, however, have suggested that renewables’ environmental profits are over-assumed
because increased renewables use simply may “put downward pressure on the cost of compliance with
the environmental regulations” rather than “reduc[ing] aggregate emissions.” CLIFF CHEN ET AL.,
WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STATE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE-LEVEL POLICY IMPACT PROJECTIONS 31 n.56 (2007), available at
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMS/reports/61580.pdf.
259
For a survey of state studies, see CHEN ET AL., supra note 258, at i–viii. For an assessment of a
twenty percent federal mandate, see generally Andy S. Kydes, Impacts of a Renewable Portfolio
Generation Standard on US Energy Markets, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 809 (2007), and see also Nogee et al.,
supra note 211, at 33.
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something as fundamental as our energy infrastructure, is “difficult if not
intractable.”260 Moreover, studies that have tried to extrapolate from
states’ experience to a possible federal one have varied widely in their
results. As one commentator aptly summarized, “[t]he outcomes of the
currently available studies are so broad that the results seem to add little
more than quantified speculations . . . . [Their] results indicate that the
impact of a national RPS could be revolutionary or exceedingly
moderate.”261
Some studies have taken a more retrospective look at the state
experience. A 2008 analysis by the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory concluded that state RPSs are “[i]ncreasingly [m]otivating
[r]enewable [e]nergy [d]evelopment,” with sixty percent of nonhydroelectric generation additions since 2002 occurring in RPS states, and
that figure rising to seventy-six percent for 2007.262 Such a finding speaks
not only to RPSs’ ability to deliver on their core deployment objective but
also to their likely national security impacts. In the long view, any use of
the national electric system to shift away from foreign oil must, in all
likelihood, rely on both increasing renewable electricity consumption and a
transition to electricity-based vehicles.263 Deploying additional renewables
now advances the first of these factors. Further, in the shorter term,
increased renewables use should help national security in a different way
by making fuel supplies less volatile. Research increasingly points to
supply volatility, rather than unavailability alone, as associated with the
economic risks of energy dependence.264 Increased renewables use should
help on this front because their availability relies on natural rather than
economic cycles, thus providing a kind of “‘societal insurance’ against
high fossil prices” during economic downturns.265
Nevertheless, the extent to which RPSs have provided these security
benefits by diversifying the generation fleet are underwhelming, at least so
far. Certainly some of this is because RPSs are relatively new; some of it
260

Kydes, supra note 259, at 814.
Fershee, supra note 23, at 66.
262
WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 12.
263
Cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL ENERGY AND FLEET MANAGEMENT:
PLUG-IN VEHICLES OFFER POTENTIAL BENEFITS, BUT HIGH COSTS AND LIMITED INFORMATION COULD
HINDER INTEGRATION INTO THE FEDERAL FLEET 13–16 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d09493.pdf (noting the importance of moving to electric vehicles in order to reduce reliance upon
oil); Martin LaMonica, Electric Cars Seen as Killer App for Smart Grid, CNET NEWS, June 20, 2009,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-10269723-54.html (noting that electric cars can reduce costs and
“allow power generators to take better advantage of wind and solar power”). Electricity comprises
roughly forty percent of the nation’s energy consumption, and seventy-one percent of our petroleum
use is in transportation. EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 22, at 37.
264
See generally Shimon Awerbuch, Determining the Real Cost: Why Renewable Power Is More
Cost-Competitive Than Previously Believed, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD, Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 53
(noting that “price volatility may well have more profound effects on economic well-being than
temporary supply disruptions”).
265
Id. at 3.
261

1384

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1339

also must be attributed to certain states’ lagging compliance rates.266 More
of it, however, may have to do with renewables’ relative costs. Virtually
all of the new renewables capacity spurred on by RPSs—ninety-three
percent—has come from wind additions,267 no doubt because wind
continues to offer one of the lowest prices among renewables.268 True,
adding wind provides fuel diversification itself. But without greater
inroads from other resources, the national generation profile retains far
more of its existing shape than one revolutionized by the rise of solar,
biomass, tidal, or other alternative energies.
State RPSs’ economic effects appear similarly moderate. Although
virtually every state that has studied the issue has predicted added jobs and
industrial output from RPS enactments,269 research on state RPSs’ actual
empirics has focused on price impacts. Those data show three trends.
First, state RPSs so far have not delivered the price decreases some
analysts have projected for a federal measure. Second, state RPSs have
increased retail prices, but those increases generally have been small.
Third, these price impacts have varied rather substantially by state. For
instance, a 2009 analysis by Wolf and Taran compared twelve RPS states’
retail prices with those of twenty-eight non-RPS states. The study
concluded that state RPSs caused “small” price increases—an average of
two cents per kilowatt-hour—but the “variability in prices among states
[was] far greater” than the average.270 The Lawrence Berkeley study
reached a comparable result. Estimating 2007 price impacts in twelve RPS
jurisdictions, the study found that state RPSs have caused price increases
of barely 0.1% (Maryland) to just over 1% (Connecticut and
Massachusetts).271

266
See WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 12, 21 (noting “limited” operational experience
with RPSs and compliance problems in Arizona, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, and
New York).
267
Id. at 13.
268
See, e.g., Frank Harris & Peter Navarro, Promoting Wind Energy Development in an Era of
Restructuring, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 34, 34 (noting that wind power “ranks second only
to hydroelectricity as the cheapest source of renewable electricity generation”).
269
CHEN ET AL., supra note 258, at 24.
270
Christian Wolf & Zinaida Taran, The Impact of Renewable Portfolio Standards on Electricity
Prices in the USA, in 2009 EABR & TLC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1, 4–5 (on file with author). In
2008, the average price of residential retail electricity in the United States was 11.36 cents/kilowatthour. EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 22, at 261.
271
WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 29. This observed trend is largely consistent with what
many economists expect. See Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards
in the United States, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 8, 17 (surveying price impact projections ranging
from roughly -6% to +9%, with a median of 0.7%).
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D. Power Forward?: Environmental Electricity, Efficacy Tendency, and
Policy Difference
This divergence in state RPS performance—from ranging renewables
deployment to differing cost impacts—underscores the market
fragmentation that state law’s dominance has engendered. But this should
not be surprising. State RPSs do not just vary in how their eligibility rules
and credit mechanisms define “renewable.” They also differ remarkably in
their policy designs.
A simple dataset makes the point. Plot the various state RPS targets
and target dates against each other, and no obvious pattern emerges.
Rather, as Figure 4 shows, the trend is one of difference, not uniformity.
State targets range from less than five percent of retail sales to thirty
percent. Dates for compliance also are not uniform; they range from 2010
to 2030. And just because a state has a lower target does not mean that it
will have an earlier compliance date, nor are later compliance dates
necessarily correlated with higher targets. All manner of combinations
exist.
Figure 4: Variation in State RPS Target Percentages and Dates272

272
Iowa, which has an RPS that is less than one percent of its demand, is not included in Figure 4.
Where states employ more than one RPS requirement—different percentages by energy “tier” or for
different electricity provider status (investor-owned utility, cooperative, municipality, for instance)—
Figure 4 employs the higher requirement. Figure 4 masks some similarities among RPSs because states
with identical targets and target years appear as a single datapoint.
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Examining other RPS design criteria further emphasizes this trend of
difference. Take two questions: (1) Is an RPS mandatory or voluntary?,
and (2) Does it apply to all of the jurisdiction’s electricity providers or only
some? In neither case is there uniformity among state laws. Rather, the
two trends are reverse images of each other. Most state RPSs are
mandatory, but most do not apply to all electricity providers in their
jurisdictions. In fact, thirty-one states impose mandatory targets, while
only five are voluntary. In contrast, only less than half of state RPSs apply
to all electricity providers, while twenty do not.
The difference in state RPS policies becomes even more apparent
when a systematic metric of RPS design is applied. This might be referred
to as the law’s “efficacy tendency.” To calculate the efficacy tendency of
any given RPS, the four RPS design attributes delineated above—the law’s
aspirational aggressiveness, its salience distortion, its market definition,
and its planning and enforcement rigor—can be assessed and scored on a
scale of 0 to 5. These four scores are then combined to reach a cumulative
efficacy tendency ranking. A ranking of 20 means the law should tend to
be more effective than lower ranked laws. A ranking closer to 0 means the
law should tend to be less effective than higher ranked laws. Thus, the
most aggressive law with little salience distortion, a broad market
definition, and strong planning and enforcement mechanisms should
receive scores of 5 in each category, for a composite ranking of 20. A
weak law with great salience distortion, a narrow market definition, and
anemic planning and enforcement mechanisms should receive lower
scores, for a composite toward 0.
For present purposes, most central is not the relative strength of state
RPSs, but rather, the similarity or difference in their rankings. Using the
above methodology, efficacy tendencies were calculated for each of the
thirty-six surveyed laws. The results demonstrate just how divergent state
RPS designs are.273 As shown in Figure 5, the laws’ composite scores vary
substantially. For instance, North Dakota received a relatively low
composite score of 10.5, in part because its RPS is voluntary, it
accordingly has no enforcement penalties, and its target is only ten
percent.274 By contrast, Washington received a higher score of 14.5, in part
because its law is mandatory, it does not exclude renewable resources, and
273

States’ efficacy tendency scores are reproduced in Appendix E. The scoring criteria used are
reproduced in Appendix F. The efficacy tendency calculations presented here represent a
preliminary—and admittedly imperfect—estimation of different RPSs’ relative strengths. The metric is
useful as a uniform measuring stick, against which state RPSs can be compared. A more accurate
efficacy tendency metric, however, would attempt to estimate more directly how much a given RPS
should spur on renewables development. For instance, the law’s mandatoriness might be separately
scored from its aggressiveness, and its aggressiveness might be expressed as a mathematical function of
(a) its target; (b) its salience distortion; and (c) the state’s current level of renewables use. Further
scholarship on this front may be warranted.
274
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-34A-101 (2009).
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it includes both enforcement penalties and advance planning
requirements.275 In short, Figure 5 confirms that some states have what we
should expect to be rather strong RPSs, but many other states have much
weaker laws. In fact, the state that ranks lowest on the efficacy tendency
scale, Iowa, has a score, 8.5, that is barely half of the highest ranked state,
California’s composite of 16.75. States also are distributed widely across
this range. A full third of state efficacy tendency scores—twelve state
scores—place one or more standard deviations from the median of 13.6.276
Figure 5: Variation in State RPS Composite Design Strength277

State RPSs range even more widely in their individual design traits.
Existing laws seem strongest in their aspirational aggressiveness and lack
of salience distortion. The mean scores for these traits are 4.0 and 3.4,
respectively.278 States seem weaker in defining the renewable market
broadly, and even more so in their planning and enforcement mechanisms.
The respective means for these traits are 3.1 and 2.8. These scores are not
surprising given the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory’s finding that state
RPSs appear to be fragmenting the renewables market.279 One would
275
See WASH REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a)(i)–(iii) (2010) (making targets mandatory); id. §
19.285.030(18) (2010) (defining “renewable resource”); id. § 19.285.060(1) (2010) (providing for a
penalty or noncompliance); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-190-040(1) (2010) (providing for annual
reporting requirements).
276
The mean for the composite scores is 13.3, the variance is 3.2, and the standard deviation is
1.8.
277
For graphing purposes, composite scores are rounded up.
278
The median for aspirational aggressiveness is 4.5. It is 3.5 for salience distortion.
279
See WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 26.
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expect a fragmented market to have a lower market definition score, with
comparatively higher variation than other design traits.
Indeed, state RPSs appear quite divergent in their market design.
States’ market definition scores range between 1 and 5, for a spread of 4.
States’ aspirational aggressiveness and planning and enforcement rigor
scores each have a range of 3.5, from 1.5 to 5 and from 1 to 4.5,
respectively, but a lower range for salience distortion. That trait’s range is
3: from a low of 2 to a high of 5. This implies that states are more varied
in the ways they define their RPS markets than how aggressive they are in
setting their RPS goals. A look at the distribution of the traits’ scores,
shown in Figure 6, confirms this. The only distribution that is at all
“clumped”—implying less variance in state RPS design—is that of
salience distortion. The remaining distributions, including that for market
definition, are well spread across a wider range, a fact confirmed by the
distributions’ statistical variance.280
Figure 6: Variation in State RPS Design Traits

280
The traits’ statistical variances are 0.6 for salience distortion, but 1.0, 0.9, and 0.8 for the other
three categories, respectively.
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Most important, however, no state is the same. For example, a state
that scores high in its aspirational aggressiveness might score just as low in
its planning and enforcement rigor—and vice versa. Contrast, for instance,
Connecticut and Michigan. These two states received identical composite
scores of 13, but how they got there differed greatly. Connecticut had a
“perfect” score of 5 for its aspirational aggressiveness but only a 2.5 for its
market definition. Michigan, on the other hand, earned a 3.5 for its
aspirational aggressiveness and a 3 for its market definition; it was higher,
at a score of 4.5, on its planning and enforcement rigor than was
Connecticut, which earned a 2. The point is plain. State design of RPSs
differs greatly, not just in general, but within and among attributes as well.
All of this is critical because of the mixed message it sends the market.
It tells investors that renewables have different values in different
jurisdictions; it makes the assessment of where and whether to build more
complex; and it introduces uncertainty precisely because the cumulative
RPS regime is so complex, and because there are so many parts to it that
can change.281
The stark variation in RPS policy designs is also important, however,
for what it says on the federal-state RPS debate. Good policy design does
not simply advance a law’s primary goal. It will also maximize any other
benefits and minimize any other costs the law might impose.282 What the
variation in state RPS design may mean, then, is that there is further reason
to move to a federal law. Certainly, RPS design alone cannot account for
states’ successes and failures. Many other factors impact how well an RPS
performs—from the overall retail market structure to financial community
expectations.283 But it is also true that any RPS’s success depends heavily
on its “implementation specifics.”284 Accordingly, from a benefits-costs
perspective, a federal RPS holds the power, potentially at least, to offer
something a state regime cannot: If designed well,285 a federal RPS has the
281

See Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 29; Fershee, supra note 23, at 66–68.
Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk
Approach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 961 (2001).
283
See Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 29–30.
284
Id. at 27.
285
The question of how a federal RPS would be designed is critical. A well designed, aggressive
federal RPS should accomplish what a mélange of state laws cannot; a poorly designed law could
exacerbate, rather than correct, state law problems. Indeed, it is clear that any federal measure will
present many, if not all, of the same design questions that state RPSs do. The proposed WaxmanMarkey legislation, for instance, would set a 20% RPS, but apply only to utilities that sell 4 million
MWh of electricity per year. It also would count efficiency measures and exclude from its base
calculation certain non-renewable power production such as new nuclear and fossil-fired plants that
employ carbon capture and sequestration technology, so that its goal is not actually 20%. See
American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 101(a) (2009). The ACELA
legislation would set a 15% renewables requirement but would also count efficiency and allow for
various waivers and compliance by payment. See American Clean Energy Leadership Act, S. 1462,
111th Cong., § 132(a) (2009). In short, any advocacy for a federal RPS must begin with the
proposition that its requirement would both: (1) set a minimum “floor” percentage that would expand
282
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chance to more uniformly reap renewables’ benefits—to capitalize on
states’ experimentation by adopting a single law that bolsters states’
strengths and ameliorates their flaws.286
VI. RESHAPING THE LANDSCAPE:
MERGING ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?
The fact that state RPSs so heavily risk undermining their very purpose
militates for taking the law national. In the political back-and-forth over
the RPS’s ancillary effects, its fundamental premise has been misplaced.
The RPS, whether state or federal, requires a well-functioning, liquid
market. The way state RPSs have been built so far, they confound this
purpose, not fulfill it. This is the core justification for transitioning the
RPS away from a thirty-six-jurisdiction regime to a central one. It must
not get lost in the shuffle.
Still, the question remains: Can a federal RPS do something more than
simply strengthen state efforts? So far, the arguments not answered by the
need for a uniform renewables market tend to stake their claims against a
national RPS, not for it. They fail to make their case.
Complaints, for instance, about winners and losers sound ominous, but
they say nothing about how best to make an RPS work. The truth is that
the only reason the winners-and-losers claim can be lodged at all is
because there are different winners and losers today. Coal-rich states
benefit economically from its extraction, just as do oil-rich states and
uranium-rich states. A law that would also benefit renewables-rich states
on the way to a more sustainable society is not inequitable. It is sound
policy.287 Moreover, the winners-and-losers argument skews the facts.
Numerous studies have shown that every state has renewable resources
utilizable under a national RPS.288 In any event, nothing about a national
the nation’s renewables use significantly above what current state laws would; and (2) allow for and
encourage concurrent state requirements that exceed that floor. This type of cooperative federalism
approach is necessary because the passage of federal legislation is always rife with opportunity for rentseeking by interested players.
286
See Shelley Welton, From the States Up: Building a National Renewable Energy Policy, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 987, 996 (2008).
287
See generally ED SMELOFF & PETER ASMUS, REINVENTING ELECTRIC UTILITIES:
COMPETITION, CITIZEN ACTION, AND CLEAN POWER (1997); JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT
THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO
SUSTAINABILITY (2008); Kevin L. Doran, Can the U.S. Achieve a Sustainable Energy Economy from
the Bottom-Up? An Assessment of State Sustainable Energy Initiatives, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 95 (2006);
J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 18 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 31 (1999); Irma S. Russell, The Sustainability Principle in Sustainable Energy, 44 TULSA
L. REV. 121 (2008).
288
See Sovacool & Cooper, Hidden Costs, supra note 171, at 35; see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF IMPLEMENTING BOTH A 25-PERCENT
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD AND A 25-PERCENT RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD BY 2025, at 14
(Aug. 2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/eeim/pdf/sroiaf(2007)05.pdf
(“Considerable increases in biomass electricity generation occur in virtually every region of the United

2010]

POWER FORWARD: THE ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL RPS

1391

RPS dictates that a utility serving, say, Georgia, must develop its
renewable portfolio there, as is evident from the very fact that many
utilities serve multiple states.289 The Georgia company could break ground
on a renewables facility in a neighboring state and then send the power
home—or capitalize on renewables 2500 miles away and then use or sell
the RECs, or both.290
Claims that a national RPS should stall because a feed-in tariff regime
would better promote renewables likewise ring hollow. The biggest
problem with the feed-in tariff is that every new policy initiative must start
somewhere, and the feed-in tariff shoulders perhaps the heaviest burden in
the American political lexicon—the moniker of “tax.” As former CIA
Director James Woolsey recently noted, feed-in tariffs have “the worst
name in the business.”291 The RPS avoids this problem; even if its name is
not the catchiest, it is not a tax, and it already has substantial momentum
behind it. Besides, casting the RPS and the feed-in tariff as an either/or
choice is unnecessarily narrow. Opponents of environmental protection
long have used false dichotomies to wage their campaigns.292 This is yet
another case. Scholarship increasingly shows that the RPS and the feed-in
tariff could work in tandem to achieve renewables deployment more
effectively than either could alone.293
A. The Energy-Environment Merger
Setting these federal challenges aside, there is another RPS
justification that the debate so far has overlooked but that deserves
consideration: A national RPS will bring energy and environmental law
closer together.294 It is well-documented that energy and environmental
law operate in separate worlds that rarely overlap, despite the fact that their

States [under a 25% RPS].”); Nogee et al., supra note 211, at 39 (“[A]ll regions do have some
renewable energy resources, and would likely see an increase in using local resources for generation
[under an RPS].”).
289
See supra Part III.C.
290
See Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 107–08.
291
Phil Taylor, House Will Get Another Shot at Feed-in Tariffs, GREENWIRE, Aug. 3, 2009,
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/08/03/6/.
292
Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement: What a Historical Juxtaposition of
the Legal Response to the Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has To Teach Environmentalists Today,
31 ENVTL. L. 229, 350–52, 356–57 (2001).
293
See Rickerson et al., supra note 204, at 83–84; see also KARLYNN CORY ET AL., FEED-IN
TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS 9–11 (Mar. 2009),
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45549.pdf.
294
For further discussion on the argument for bringing energy law and environmental law closer
together, see generally, for instance, Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the EnergyEnvironment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473 (2010), and Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental
Law a Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy Sources?, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (2010).
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subject matters are intrinsically intertwined.
Energy and the
environment are two sides of the same problem. Energy law dictates our
resource use; environmental law controls the effects of that use. Energy
use drives our ecological problems; those problems cause us to question
how we use energy. Combining the rules that govern different aspects of
the same problem only makes sense.
First, and most importantly, the RPS helps meld energy and
environmental law by pushing them toward a shared aim. Much of why
energy and environmental law have remained so divergent is because they
share disparate pasts. Energy law arose from economic concerns and
utility regulation—the need for a consistent power supply at a reasonable
price.296 Environmental law, by contrast, sprung from a tradition of risk
reduction and resource management—the need to protect society against
toxics and the tragedy of the commons.297 The RPS seeks to pull the fields
away from their differing pasts and push them forward toward a common
future, at least for electricity regulation.
The way the RPS does this is straightforward. It takes energy law’s
consumption-focused objective of ample supply and tempers it with
environmental law’s hope for a healthier, more sustainable world. It takes
environmental law’s technology-centered end-of-pipe remediation tools
and replaces them with energy law’s front-end resource planning
principles.298 It takes, in other words, elements of both fields and mixes
them together—merging, in part, the disciplines.
Second, the RPS combines energy and environmental law by using a
target-and-trading scheme, the very kind of market-based regulation that
both fields increasingly embrace. For energy law, the trend is seen in the
movement away from cost-of-service ratemaking and toward market-based

295
E.g., Kenneth A. Manaster, An Introductory Analysis of Energy Law and Policy, 22 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1151, 1158 (1982); Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to Clinton: From Grand
Provider to Market Facilitator, 25 ENVTL. L. 715, 728 (1995).
296
See supra Part II.A.
297
See, e.g., Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515,
517–19 (2007); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 164–65 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Reconstructing the Wall of Virtue: Maxims for the CoEvolution of Environmental Law and Environmental Science, 37 ENVTL. L. 1063, 1080 (2007). For
critiques of environmental law’s failure to sufficiently join science and policy, see ROBERT B. KEITER,
KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS, DEMOCRACY, & AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS, at x–xi
(2003); Robert W. Adler, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science in
Environmental Law, 27 VT. L. REV. 249, 249–51 (2003); A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the
Landscape: The Revival of Watershed Management in the United States, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1059, 1059–60, 1102 (2008).
298
Compare Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environmental
Mind?, 3 WIS. L. REV. 463, 472–76 (1989), with Clinton A. Vince et al., Integrated Resource
Planning: The Case for Exporting Comprehensive Energy Planning to the Developing World, 25 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 371, 382–84 (1993); see also David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing
Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 66 (2009).
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299

rates.
For environmental law, it comes in the shift from command-andcontrol pollution limits to market-oriented regimes, such as cap-and-trade
measures.300 The RPS similarly relies on the market to achieve its
statutorily imposed objective. Rather than dictating utility-by-utility a
percentage of renewables that each company must acquire (as could have
occurred through state regulatory proceedings), the RPS sets a target and
then expects utilities to rely on the market to meet that target most
efficiently. Thus, the RPS moves energy and environmental law closer
together by showing that, as a practical matter, merging the fields might
not be as difficult as one would presume. In the RPS, there is an example
of how a tool increasingly used by both fields also can be employed to
pursue an objective that blends both of their aims.
Despite, however, the RPS’s ability to join energy and environmental
law in a way they rarely have been before, no one is touting this as a
rationale for a federal RPS. Why?
Perhaps the reason is that the merger’s likely benefits are so obvious.
Holistic governance is virtually always better than fragmentation: more
effective, more efficient, more robust.301 Or, perhaps this justification has
not garnered attention because the fields have become so disconnected that
the reasons for combining them no longer are plain. “Today, energy laws
and environmental laws are administered separately, by separate
agencies . . . based on different . . . assumptions.”302 There thus is utility in
fleshing out what dividends, if any, an environmental-energy law merger
might yield.
The most obvious is efficiency. Combining energy and environmental
law should realign the fields’ goals so that they work hand-in-hand rather
than at odds. From the electric generation perspective, this is the
jurisdictional fragmentation problem Peter Huber described decades ago.303
Environmental law labors to curb, for instance, plants’ SOx and NOx
pollution, while energy regulation’s emphasis on reliable but inexpensive
299

See supra Part II.B.
See, e.g., Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from
Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J.L. & ECON. 19, 24 (1995); Bradley C. Karkainnen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89
GEO. L.J. 257, 270 (2001); Michael C. Naughton, Establishing Interstate Markets for Emissions
Trading of Ozone Precursors, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 233 (1994).
301
Cf. Lincoln L. Davies, Just a Big, “Hot Fuss”? Assessing the Value of Connecting Suburban
Sprawl, Land Use and Water Rights Through Assured Supply Laws, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1217, 1236–38
(2007) (assessing potential benefits from combining land and water planning).
302
Joseph P. Tomain, To a Point, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2006).
303
See Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1013–15, 1025 (1987) (“The heart of the problem is the division of authority
among several separate agencies . . . . EPA’s regulatory agenda focuses mainly on continuous low-level
emissions of conventional pollutants . . . . FERC reigns over its smaller regulatory kingdom in equally
regal isolation . . . . The problem is that aggregate [environmental] impact depends as much on the mix
of technologies chosen as on the environmental burden imposed by each alone . . . .”).
300
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electricity perpetuates construction of the very facilities that produce those
emissions. The right hand does not control what the left is doing, and the
left is undoing what the right is attempting. RPSs compel the hands to
work together, at least to a degree. They command deployment of
generation facilities that promote both fields’ objectives: sufficient
electricity supplies for energy law and less pollution for environmental
law. RPSs, in other words, create a regulatory efficiency that did not exist
before: a synthesis of policy aims.
A related benefit is the potential for regulatory synergies. Making
energy and environmental law overlap may help the fields not only better
achieve their own objectives, but may also propel them to do more than
each would individually. Take again the example of a new power plant.
There, environmental law’s objectives might be considered fully achieved
if the plant meets applicable pollution controls. Likewise, energy law’s
objectives are satisfied if the facility assures a sufficient electricity supply
at a reasonable cost. Under the RPS, both fields better achieve their goals
by not undermining each other. But RPSs can do more. The RPS might,
for instance, help the facility’s owner exceed mandated pollution
reductions.304 The owner also might go beyond energy law’s standard
objective of a sufficient electricity supply because renewable sources are,
by definition, more abundant than nonrenewables over time.
Another possible benefit is improved decision making. Most notably,
this may occur when regulators who traditionally have not consulted each
other begin sharing tools, data, and expertise across the regulatory divide.
This has begun in other contexts where, for instance, land and water
planners increasingly rely on each other’s expertise,305 and it could happen
for energy and environmental law as well. Environmental regulators that
increasingly operate markets might have much to learn from utility
regulators whose traditional bailiwick is economic supervision. Utility
regulators, likewise, might find in environmental law’s historic technology
promotion306 ways to make RPSs run more smoothly. This is, in other
words, the regulatory “cross-pollenization” benefit of merging energy and
environmental law.307
Finally, combining energy and environmental law may have a longterm benefit. It may help gear our policies toward sustainability.
Returning once again to the new power plant example, it is obvious that
today, with or without an RPS, utilities can choose to construct renewablefueled facilities. What, then, does the RPS add? The RPS requires a more
304
See, e.g., Jonathan D. Abe et al., NETS: Capturing Electricity Information in New England,
ELECTRICITY J., May 1999, at 46, 51.
305
See Davies, Hot Fuss, supra note 301, at 1269–74.
306
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 21, at 29 & n.19, 33 & n.39.
307
Davies, Hot Fuss, supra note 301, at 1237–38.

2010]

POWER FORWARD: THE ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL RPS

1395

complete internalization of long-term externalities than health-based
pollution regulation does now. For example, today’s pollution laws do not
include the intergenerational value of depleted nonrenewable resources; the
public health effects unforeseen or not captured by politically-brokered
emissions standards; or the benefits, aesthetic, moral, ecological, or
otherwise, of moving toward a pollution-minimal world. To be sure, each
of these objectives already is embedded in other areas of environmental
law, but only to a small degree. Likewise, a direct tax or a permitting
system that includes these externalities’ full cost could capture them,
perhaps more efficiently than an RPS.308 The problem, however, is that
those tools typically rely on immediately quantifiable societal costs—and
then only the politically palatable ones.309 Politicians, however, have
intense incentives to avoid imposing on their constituents short-term costs
that produce primarily long-term benefits. This is precisely why the RPS
is important. It can provide an assurance that the energy supply going
forward will be more sustainable. It can, in other words, make energy and
environmental law not just more market-correcting, but also more
planning-perfecting.
B. The Federal-State Debate
That the RPS can help merge environmental and energy law, and that
this merger promises significant benefits, thus seems clear. The question
remains, however, whether the fact that there are benefits to be gained
from an RPS-induced energy-and-environmental-law merger says anything
about whether the RPS should be local or national.
One obvious response is that, simply because of its scope, a national
RPS is more appropriate. The 2008 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory study
showed that state RPSs at the time applied to just under half of the United
States’ electric demand.310 By definition, a national RPS should
dramatically increase this figure.311 Thus, whether the RPS benefits in
question are direct or supplementary, a coast-to-coast RPS that delivers
these benefits nationwide should be favored over a state-by-state approach
that is inherently limited in reach.
That response alone may be enough. There is, however, another,
308

Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 86–87.
See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun
Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21, 45–51 (2008); Richard J.
Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present To Liberate the Future,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1153–54, 1157 (2009); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 999–1000 (1999).
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WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 5–6.
311
It is unlikely a federal standard would apply to 100% of electric demand because some utilities
would be exempted. The federal mandate also would need to be set higher than states’ aggregate
target—an essential feature of any federal RPS. See supra note 285.
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perhaps stronger argument for a national law. It is that the RPS’s merging
of energy and environmental law could put the fields on a new path. Prior
attempts to directly combine energy and environmental law are few and far
between and, even then, have been modest in their aims.312
The RPS is different. It is bold, pervasive. It seeks to change the
shape of what is, effectively, nearly half of the United States’ energy
supply,313 and it compels that change to start now. The RPS is thus unlike
our past, meeker efforts at energy regulatory reform, centered so heavily
on research, funding, and fumbling toward sustainability.314 The RPS
demands a new vision. It looks beyond the world where energy
consumption and environmental protection necessarily conflict. It searches
for a different direction, a space where energy and environmental law work
together, not apart.
The RPS, in other words, has the potential to act much like an off-ramp
on a highway. Taking it might help put us on a course other regulatory
tools cannot. It could begin a long-term cultural transition to a society
reliant on resources that are not scarce rather than attempting to mitigate
the ecological effects of consuming those that are.
Undoubtedly, the current regime of state-based RPSs also might
accomplish this, but only to a point. A federal law is more likely to
succeed at overhauling a regulatory system with coast-to-coast effects.
The national stage is simply bigger. Federal law carries an “imprimatur”
that state law does not.315 It says more, more loudly, to more people. A
federal RPS, accordingly, would not just push more of our generation
supply to sustainable sources, it is more likely to be seen as an example for
how to merge energy and environmental goals in other contexts. It is, in
short, more likely to convey the message that reconciling energy and
environmental law is not a local priority, it is national.
If, then, what we seek in an RPS is not just a first big step toward a
more sustainable culture, but also a way to begin reinventing our system of
regulation—to move power regulation forward—the path there seems
clear. It is the same path all the other RPS evidence points to: a national
one.
312
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313
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314
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315
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VII. CONCLUSION
There are many reasons why proposals for a national RPS remain in
gridlock, but the most troubling may be that the public debate has lost
focus. Its ascendancy through the states has made the RPS many things,
but at its core, it is still about one—promoting renewables deployment to,
in turn, begin changing the shape of our energy infrastructure. Focusing on
whether the RPS has merit at all is wasted effort; with thirty-six local
measures already in place, the point is moot. The question that remains is
whether a state-based or a federal system will best accomplish the RPS’s
objectives.
Here the evidence is not mixed. The current state-based regime
threatens to undermine the very goals it pursues. Existing state RPSs
prevent the formation of a uniform renewables market because they define
what is renewable, and what is a renewable credit, so differently. They
then exacerbate this market distortion by erecting a stunning number of
geographical barriers to trade. All these problems are then only reinforced
by the myriad state RPS policy designs, a phenomenon overwhelmingly
confirmed by application of the “efficacy tendency” metric developed here.
A federal approach cannot promise panacea, but it can fix the problems
the state regime has created. A national approach would create a national
market—fundamentally important since markets are the regulatory tool the
RPS invokes. A national RPS also could have another, often overlooked
benefit. It could reinforce the RPS’s own efforts by helping energy and
environmental law merge. If energy truly “is the center stage upon which
environmental law . . . will be played” in the years to come,316 either of
these reasons might be justification enough for a federal RPS. Together,
they make a strong case indeed.
Over seventy years ago, in a very different context, the Supreme Court
warned that our nation “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together.”317 With the muddle of state
RPSs looming and a federal proposal on the table in every recent session,
perhaps it is time for Congress to begin heeding the Court’s advice.

316
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APPENDIX A: ELIGIBLE RESOURCES BY STATE
Wind

Biomass

Methane

Solar
PV

Solar /
Thermal

Hydro

Geothermal

Arizona

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

California

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Colorado

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Connecticut

●

●

●

●

●

●

Delaware

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

District
of Columbia

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Hawaii

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Illinois

●

●

●

●

●

●

Iowa

●

●

●

●

●

Kansas

●

●

●

●

●

●

Maine

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Maryland

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Massachusetts

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Michigan

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Minnesota

●

●

●

●

●

●

Missouri

●

●

●

●

●

●

Montana

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Nevada

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

New
Hampshire

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

New Jersey

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

New Mexico

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

New York

●

●

●

●

North
Carolina

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

North Dakota

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Ohio

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Oregon

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Pennsylvania

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Rhode Island

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

South Dakota

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Texas

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Utah

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Vermont

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Virginia

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Washington

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

West Virginia

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Wisconsin

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

State

Ocean

●
●
●
●

●

CoGen

●

●

●

●
●

●
●
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APPENDIX B: CREDIT MULTIPLIERS BY STATE
State

Credit Multipliers

Arizona

Multiple, additive multipliers up to 200%

Colorado

“Community based” eligible generation (125%)
Solar (300%)

Delaware

Off-shore wind (350% pre-2017)
Renewables-based fuel cell (300% pre-2014)
Solar (300% DG, in-state PV pre-2014)
Wind (150% in-state pre-2012)

District of Columbia

Methane (110% pre-2010)
Solar and wind (120% pre-2007)
Solar and wind (110% pre-2010)

Maine

“Community-based” generation (150%)

Maryland

Methane (110% pre-2009)
Wind (120% pre-2006, 110% pre-2009)

Michigan

Solar (300%)
Certain in-state and other power (110-20%)
Advanced cleaner energy (up to 1000%)

Nevada

Efficiency reductions in peak demand (200%)
Solar (240% for certain customer-sited PV)

New Mexico

Agency authority to vary REC value by
technology

Ohio

Biomass (potential multiplier based on price)

Oregon

Certain state-owned backup generators (200%)
Solar (200%)

Texas

Non-wind (200%)

Utah

In-state solar (240%)

Virginia

Solar (200%)
Wind (200%)

Washington

Distributed generation (200%)
State apprenticeship construction (120%)

West Virginia

Renewable facilities sited on in-state reclaimed
surface mines (150%)
Renewable distributed generation (200%)
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APPENDIX C: REC SHELF LIVES BY STATE
State

REC Shelf Life

Arizona

Unlimited

California

Unlimited

Colorado

5 years

Connecticut

3 years

Delaware

3 years

District of Columbia

3 years

Illinois

Unlimited

Maine

2 years, up to 33% of the goingforward requirement

Maryland

3 years

Massachusetts

2 years, up to 30% of the goingforward requirement

Minnesota

4 years

Missouri

3 years

Montana

2 years

Nevada

Up to 4 years,
in PUC’s discretion

New Hampshire

2.25 years, up to 30% of the
going-forward requirement

New Jersey

Current year only (except
for solar RECs = 2 years)

New Mexico

4 years

North Carolina

10 years

Ohio

5 years

Oregon

Unlimited, up to 20% of the
going-forward requirement

Pennsylvania

3 years

Rhode Island

3 years, up to 30% of the goingforward requirement

Texas

3 years

Utah

Unlimited

Virginia

Unlimited

Washington

3 years

West Virginia

Unlimited

Wisconsin

5 years
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APPENDIX D: GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS BY STATE
Flat In-State
Preference
States

Illinois
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Carolina
Ohio
Texas

Weak
In-State
Preference
Minnesota
New Mexico
Utah

In-State
Multiplier

Regional
Preference

Arizona
Colorado
Delaware
Kansas
Michigan
Missouri
Ohio
Utah
West Virginia

California
Connecticut
D.C.
Illinois
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Montana
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Washington
Virginia
West Virginia
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APPENDIX E: EFFICACY TENDENCY SCORES
State
Arizona

Aspirational
Aggressiveness

Salience
Distortion

Market
Definition

Planning and
Enforcement

Composite

4

3.75

3

3

13.75

California

4.5

4.75

4.5

3

16.75

Colorado

4.5

2

2

2.5

11

5

3.5

2.5

2

13

Delaware

4.5

4

3

4.5

16

D.C.

14

Connecticut

4.5

3.5

3.5

2.5

Hawaii

5

3.5

3

2.5

14

Illinois

5

3.5

3

3.5

15
8.5

Iowa

3

3

1

1.5

Kansas

4.5

3

2

2.5

12

Maine

3.5

2.75

3.5

2

11.75

Maryland

4.5

3.5

3

4.5

15.5

Massachusetts

4.5

5

3

2.5

15

Michigan

3.5

2

3

4.5

13

Minnesota

5

4

2

3.5

14.5

Missouri

4

3

2

4

13

Montana

4

4.75

2.5

2.5

13.75

Nevada

5

3

3

3.5

14.5

New Hampshire

4.5

4.25

3

2.5

14.25

New Jersey

4.5

3.5

3.5

3

14.5

New Mexico

4.5

3

2

2.5

12

5

3.5

1.5

1

11

North Carolina

3.5

3.5

3

2.5

12.5

North Dakota

1.5

3.5

4

1.5

10.5

Ohio

5

2.5

2

3

12.5

Oregon

5

3.5

3.5

3

15

Pennsylvania

4

2.5

2.5

4

13
14.5

New York

Rhode Island

4

3.5

3.5

3.5

South Dakota

1.5

3.5

5

1.5

11.5

Texas

3

3.25

3

2

11.25

Utah

2.5

2.5

4

2

11

Vermont

2.5

5

5

1.5

14

Virginia

2

3

4.5

2

11.5

Washington

4

4

3.5

3

14.5

West Virginia

5

2

3

3.5

13.5

3.5

4

4

3.5

15

Wisconsin
Mean

4.0

3.4

3.1

2.8

13.3

Median

4.5

3.5

3.0

2.5

13.6

Variance

1.0

0.6

0.9

0.8

3.2
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APPENDIX F: EFFICACY TENDENCY SCORING METRIC
Aspirational Aggressiveness
Compulsoriness

Mandatory

Voluntary

2.5

0.5

Aggressiveness

Target ≥
25%

Target =
20–24%

Target =
15–19%

Target =
10–14%

Target
< 10%

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

Salience Distortion
Actual Energy

Sales / Energy
1

0.5

Grandfathering

New construction
(within 2 yrs.)

Lite grandfathering
(within 10 yrs.)

Grandfathering
(>10 yrs.)

1

0.5

0

No multipliers

Weak multipliers

Heavy multipliers

Credit Multipliers

Dilution

Utility Class Exemptions

Capacity

1

0.5

0

Renewables only

Renewables plus
efficiency or co-gen

Renewables plus
fossil or nuclear

1

0.5

0

No exemptions

Exemptions = 1

Exemptions ≥ 1

1

0.75

0.5

Market Definition
Source Breadth
Geographic Breadth
REC Use

All renewables

Some limits

Extensive limits

2

1

0

No limits

Regional limits

In-state limits

1

0.5

0

Uses RECs

Uses RECs with limits

Does not use RECs

2

1

0

Planning and Enforcement Rigor
Enforcement

Penalties
Cost Recovery
Planning /
Compliance

Agency-enforced

Self-policing

1

0

Strong

Medium

Weak

None

2

1

0.5

0

Guaranteed

If prudent

Silent

1

0.5

0

Advance planning and
annual proceeding

Advance planning or
annual proceeding

No
requirement

1

0.5

0

